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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar' in 1975 began a
new chapter in the application of the antitrust laws to the professions
and their professional organizations. The prosecution of professional
organizations, and particularly of organized medicine, under the anti-
trust laws is not an entirely new development, however, because profes-
sional organizations had been involved in antitrust litigation long
before Goldfarb.2 The peculiarities of medical discipline make orga-
nized medicine a good object for Federal Trade Commission inquiry
and for antitrust enforcement.
The regulation of medical practice-or the discipline of physi-
cians- has long been a state police power concern as well as a matter
for professional self-regulation. One of the difficulties of medical disci-
pline is the lack of a single consistent structure. Instead, a number of
levels of state and private regulatory efforts exist, to which another
level of federally stimulated peer and utilization review has been added
in the years since the advent of Medicare and Medicaid which further
requires both state and private organizational involvement. These sepa-
rate layers of professional discipline overlap at many points and pro-
vide opportunities not only for ethical self-regulation but also for self-
protective economic restraint and abuse.
An inherent and recurrent problem in the regulation of any profes-
sion is professionalism itself. Only physicians know enough to judge
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2. See, eg., United States v. Oregon Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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whether a physician's professional performance meets minimum pro-
fessional standards, just as only lawyers are capable of judging another
lawyer's professional performance. In any profession, codes of ethics
are needed to provide a measure of professional competence. By the
same token, limiting professional practice to the professionally compe-
tent involves the exclusion of some from practice. Invariably a question
arises whether standards--either those contained in codes of profes-
sional ethics or in medical practice acts-are designed to protect the
public against unscrupulous or incompetent practitioners, or whether
they merely protect insiders against competition in violation of the an-
titrust laws. It is not always easy to tell which of these purposes is being
advanced, and it is precisely in this area of doubt that abuses are found
and antitrust claims are raised.
Following a brief discussion of antitrust doctrines with special rel-
evance to professional regulation, this Article will focus on the methods
of medical regulation. The discussion will commence with an account
of the official state regulatory scheme of physician licensure and official
discipline. It will continue with an examination of the private discipli-
nary controls exercised by state and county medical societies, by hospi-
tals through the grant and denial of privileges, and by private national
boards through specialty certification. Finally, the federally required
schemes of utilization review and peer review by professional standard
review organizations (PSROs) will be considered. The analysis will
identify the points of contact between the various levels of control and
will examine the potential for antitrust violations in the context of each
separate layer.
II. ANTITRUST DOCTRINES WITH SPECIAL RELEVANCE
TO MEDICAL PRACTICE
Medical practice is regulated by the state and by non-governmen-
tal professional societies, sometimes by special delegation from the
state. A number of doctrines or exemptions with special and recurring
relevance in the application of the antitrust laws to the practice of pro-
fessions have been discussed in several recent trend-setting decisions 3
and these doctrines will be analyzed briefly below.
3. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 2923 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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A. Some Comments on Parker v. Brown-The State Action
Exemption.
State regulation of a profession or occupation invariably creates
access barriers and some limitations on the conduct of economic activi-
ties, or, in a general sense, restraints of trade. The recurring issue is
whether the Sherman Act allows state regulatory activity that has an-
ticompetitive effects, or whether it brings state agencies under its scope,
raising the possibility of the prosecution of state agencies for Sherman
Act violations.4 The so-called state action doctrine, exempting certain
state activities from the application of the Sherman Act, had its begin-
ning in Parker v. Brown.' The answer here suggested is that regulatory
actions within the traditional scope of the police power to protect
health, safety and welfare are not subject to antitrust enforcement, even
though such exercises of the police power may have incidental an-
ticompetitive or restraint of trade effects. It is likely, therefore, that
state regulation of medical practice will continue free from Sherman
Act intervention, unless such regulation exceeds its traditional scope or
merely uses the form of state law to advance private economic interests.
The broad sweep of the doctrine as originally pronounced 6 would
have barred all efforts to bring professions regulated under state law
within the ambit of the antitrust laws. However, in 1975 the Supreme
Court reexamined this exemption policy in Goldfarb, where the mini-
mum fee schedule of a county bar association was challenged under the
Sherman Act. A state statute had assigned the task of regulating the
legal profession to the state supreme court, which had delegated its ad-
ministrative duties to the state bar. The county bar claimed that its fee
schedule was "prompted" by the state bar and was exempt from the
4. See generally Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 570 (1975); Blackstone, The A.M.A. and the Osteopaths: A Study of the Power of Organized
Medicine, 22 ANTrrRUST BULL. 405 (1977); Craver, TheApplication of Labor andAntitrust Laws to
Physician Unions: The Needfor a Re-Evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a Radically Changing
Field, 27 HAsTINGS L.J. 55 (1975); Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State
Action Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. I (1976); Handler, Twenty-fourth AnnualAntitrust Review, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-18 (1972); Kaplin, Professional Power and Judicial Review: The Health
Professions, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 710 (1976); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process andAntitrust:
Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 328 (1975); Wallace, Occupational Licensing
and CertbIcation: Remediesfor Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46, 89-127 (1972); Note, Parker v.
Brown Revisited, The StateAction Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
898 (1977).
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
6. Id. at 350-51. The Parker Court held that the Sherman Act was designed "to suppress
combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corpora-
tions." Id. at 351. The Court found "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities di-
rected by its legislature." Id. at 350-5 1.
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Sherman Act under Parker. Finding no statutory mandate to create
price floors, the Supreme Court held that these anticompetitive mini-
mum fee schedules were not directed by the state acting as a sovereign,
and that consequently they were not exempt from antitrust enforce-
ment. The Court's analysis indicates that a state agency acting pursuant
to an explicit legislative mandate will be covered by the Parker exemp-
tion. However, if the state agency is acting ultra vires, the regulatory
agency will not be exempt from antitrust action."
After Goldfarb, for the state action exemption to apply, state regu-
latory agencies have the burden of showing, at the very least, that any
anticompetitive restrictions which their regulations have imposed are
"compelled by" state law. There has been much discussion of the ques-
tion whether the agency must satisfy this burden by pointing to an ex-
plicit legislative mandate or may imply its authority from a general
legislative intent.9 Though much of the discussion of the Parker ex-
emption focuses on the explicitness of the legislative direction, most of
this discussion is superficial and probably beside the point. 1° The real
issue-which is increasingly being addressed in the cases after
Goldfarb-is the extent to which the Sherman Act may interfere with
the regular exercise of the states' police power."' As Milton Handler
has warned, the Sherman Act should not be permitted to serve as a
basis for the broad invalidation of state law, serving the same question-
able purpose as the earlier doctrine of substantive due process. 12
The state action defense was successfully asserted after Goldfarb
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona'3 where the Supreme Court, though
invalidating on first amendment grounds the ban on legal advertising,
rejected the claim under the federal antitrust law because restrictions
on advertising were explicitly required by the Supreme Court of Ari-
7. 421 U.S. at 790.
8. Here, the state bar joined what was essentially a private anticompetitive effort. "The fact
that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield
that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members." Id. at 791.
9. See generally Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The
Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 475 (1977); Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar:
The Professions are Subject to the Sherman Act, 41 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1976); Comment,
Antitrust--Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar-Professional Legal Services are Held to be Within the
Ambit of FederalAntitrust Laws, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 254 (1976).
10. The issue of an "explicit" as against a "general" legislative mandate--with the explicit
mandate surviving and the general mandate yielding to the Sherman Act-loses much of its force
in the light of the fact that an agency's primary regulatory purpose is most likely to be expressed in
explicit, rather than general terms.
I1. See, eg., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
12. Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown StateAction Doctrine, supra note 4,
at 6-7, 16-17.
13. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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zona, the "ultimate body wielding the State's power over practice of
law" pursuant to the state constitution. 14 Because the state had adopted
a rule which restricted advertising, a rule which was part of its regula-
tion of the practice of law, the Supreme Court held that the Arizona
Bar was carrying out state law and was, therefore, entitled to state ac-
tion immunity. In analyzing Parker v. Brown, the Bates Court followed
the method of analysis employed by the Court in Goldfarb, namely
that the "threshold inquiry" was "whether the activity is required by
the State acting as sovereign."15
Nonetheless, the state action immunity may not be available even
where a governmental entity is directly involved. In City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 6 the Supreme Court faced a counter-
claim by a utility company that a city utility regulatory agency and two
Louisiana cities had violated the antitrust laws. The charges included
assertions of conspiracies in restraint of trade, including sham litigation
to delay the power company's construction of a nuclear power plant;
the inclusion of covenants in the cities' debentures that prevented com-
petition in the provision of power; conspiracies relating to the designa-
tion of service areas; and tie-in requirements with respect to the
purchase of electricity from the city to obtain gas and water services. In
a five to four decision, with the majority split three and the dissent two
ways, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that a
valid cause of action had been stated. The only issue on which a major-
ity of the Court could agree was that municipalities do not necessarily
share in the Parker state action exception. The decision is not inconsis-
tent, however, with an analysis which stresses antitrust immunity for
traditional exercises of the police power; both the majority and the dis-
senters would have applied the Parker exception to "an act of govern-
ment by the State as sovereign."' 7 The facts alleged, however, clearly
raised a question whether the two cities had gone beyond the exercise
of normal regulatory powers encompassed in the police power. 18 Appli-
cations of the Sherman Act to state and local governmental activities
have also been upheld in other instances where these governments
14. Id. at 360.
15. 421 U.S. at 790.
16. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
17. Id. at 1137, 1145.
18. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the challenged activity was
authorized by the state. In interpreting Goldfarb, the plurality held that a specific statutory com-
mand by the state legislature was not required. Sufficient state authority exists, it found, if the
court is able to ascertain, "'from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particu-
lar area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.'" Id. at 1138 (quot-
ing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (1977)).
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acted in a non-regulatory manner.19
It seems that the formulation of Goldfarb accords with this analy-
sis. Under Goldfarb, a public official who carries out a requirement of
state law is protected by the Parker doctrine if the activity is an exer-
cise of the power of the state acting as a sovereign. The state clearly acts
as a sovereign when it acts within the scope of its traditional powers to
protect health, safety and welfare- e., within the traditional scope of
the police power. This analysis is further supported by cases that in-
volve the state action exemption dealing with anticompetitive activity
of private individuals allegedly under the direction of the state.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,20 an important analytical sequel
to Goldfarb, a private utility company was charged with restraining
competition in the sale of light bulbs, which the company provided free
to its customers, though the cost of the program was included in the
rate scale approved by the state regulatory agency. Justice Stevens, in
rejecting the application of the Parker defense,2 developed a test for
state action immunity for private individuals acting under state law. In
his view, to be exempt the private action must be compelled by a state
law or regulation, and the state must take an extensive role-and not
merely acquiesce-in the formulation of the allegedly anticompetitive
19. In Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975), county officials and conces-
sionaires were found subject to the Sherman Act for an alleged conspiracy to bar the sale of
plaintiff's malt beverages at municipal facilities. In Allegheny Uniforms v. Howard Uniform Co.,
384 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1974), the State Port Authority was sued for restricting a manufac-
turer's opportunity to sell his uniforms to Authority employees by requiring employees to
purchase uniforms manufactured by a specified manufacturer. In both of these cases Parker did
not protect the public agencies. Neither the power to regulate municipal facilities nor the power to
regulate the affairs of the port required interference with competition in the sale of malt beverages
or in the sale of uniforms-the ordinary scope of the respective agencies' regulatory powers did
not include, even incidentally, such restriction of competition as part of the regulatory scheme. See
also Brenner v. State Bd. of Motor Vehicle Mfgs., Dealers and Salesmen, 413 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (state administrative agency has burden of showing that its regulations are compelled by
the state).
20. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
21. Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for a divided Court, noted that the carefully drafted language
in Parker unequivocally differentiates between official action and individual action even when
commanded by the state and added: "Since the case now before us does not call into question the
legality of any act of the State of Michigan or any of its officials or agents, it is not controlled by
the Parker decision." Id. at 591-92 & n.24.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring with Mr. Justice Stevens, suggested a balancing test to
determine the legality of state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity. The potential harms of the reg-
ulations should be weighed against the benefits to be gained by restrictions on competition. State
action designed to protect health and safety would be presumed immune from antitrust action. "I
would assess the justifications of such enactments in the same way as is done in equal protection
review, and where such justifications are at all substantial (as one would expect them to be in the
case of most professional licensing or fee-selling schemes. . .), I would be reluctant to find the
restraint unreasonable." Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
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policy. The activities of the private individual must be required by, or
directly carry out, the state regulation. If the state regulatory policy is
in conflict with the policy of the federal antitrust laws, an exemption, to
the minimum extent necessary, will be implied to make the state act
work. Finally, the state's regulatory interest which results in limiting
competition must outweigh the federal antitrust policy.2 The Cantor
case, on its facts, failed to meet any of these standards, for state utility
regulations neither required nor regarded as essential the anticompeti-
tive restriction on the sale of light bulbs.
An examination of recent decisions interpreting the Parker state
action doctrine leads to the conclusion that the doctrine is alive and
well as applied to traditional and accepted exercises of the police power
to protect health, safety and welfare. Exercises of proprietary powers
are suspect, as are economic regulations not incident to, or within the
scope of, the delegated regulatory powers within the agency's jurisdic-
tion. If the state agency is held to be acting beyond its mandate, the
Court is likely to apply the standard developed in Cantor to determine
the scope of antitrust immunity for private individuals acting under a
state regulation. 3
It is likely that state regulations of medical practice which reflect
the application of the police power for the protection of the public will
be upheld as exempt from antitrust laws even if they incidentally oper-
ate to limit competition. On the other hand, regulations issued by medi-
cal societies under color of state law will have to meet a more stringent
test.2
4
B. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine-A ntitrust Law, State Action, and
the Right to Petition and Complain.
The Noerr-Pennington25 doctrine, rooted in first amendment pol-
icy, basically states that the Sherman Act should not interfere with the
right to communicate with public officials.26 This right to petition pub-
22. Id. at 596.
23. For lower courts that have followed Cantor, see City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michi-
gan Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977);
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977); Surety Title Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977). For a somewhat similar,
though more detailed, independent analysis, see Note, supra note 4.
24. See Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, supra note 4, at 11. See also Hen-
nessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d
280 (4th Cir. 1977).
25. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
26. For a discussion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Note, Physician Influence:
Afppling Noerr-Pennington to the MedicalProfession, 1978 DuKE L.J. 701. See also Costilo, Anti-
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lie officials is limited neither by the anticompetitive purposes of the
petitioner nor by the fact that it forms part of an otherwise illegal
scheme.' The doctrine finds ready opportunities for application in
fields of professional regulation where the members of the regulated
group may find occasion to appeal or complain to government agencies
for regulation and enforcement that will raise professional standards by
keeping out allegedly less well-trained, less ethical or less highly profes-
sional competitors who happen to charge less for their services.28
With functions of professional discipline and the regulation of
medical practice divided up among layers of government agencies and
private organizations, the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
often runs into the question of whether the complaint was indeed ad-
dressed to a legislative or executive organ of government or whether it
was addressed to a person or body not a government, but an instrumen-
tality of professional governance-ie., whether the petitioner or com-
plainant spoke to the government, or merely to himself. So, for
instance, in Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine was held inapplicable to certain allegedly
official conversations with members of a hospital staff and leading
members of a local medical society, though it was held applicable to
conversations with the executive director of the state board of medical
examiners.29
C. The Learned Profession Exemption.
If learned professions such as medicine were entirely exempt from
antitrust regulation, private medical societies would be free to engage
trust'r Newest Quagmir" The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967); Handler,
Twentyfourth-4nnualAntitrustReiew, supra note 4, at 11-12; Comment, GovernmentalAction and
Antitrust Immunity, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 521, 523-25 (1971); Note, Application of the Sherman Act to
Attempts to Influence GovernmentAction, 81 HARv. L. REv. 847, 848-54 (1968). For the so-called
"sham exception" to Noerr-Penningon, see California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
27. "Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a
broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670
(1965).
28. See, e.g., United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
29. 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976). The case involved an alleged conspiracy of economic
boycott of the Feminist Women's Health Center, which provided first trimester elective abortions
for a fee of $150. During the alleged boycott no local physician would work at the Center. The
physicians charged in the conspiracy, all of whom performed their services at the Tallahassee
Memorial Hospital (TMH), charged $400. Evidence submitted on a motion for a preliminary
injunction indicated that the TMH obstetric/gynecological staff, which passes on physicians who
practice at that hospital, had decided by resolution that it would not approve the Feminist Center
unless a TMH staff member was a member of the clinic. Following advertising and favorable
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in anticompetitive self-regulation without any accountability. It had
been assumed for some time that the learned professions were exempt
from antitrust prosecution because professional activity was not consid-
ered "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.30
Although there had never been a clear holding that such an exemption
was to be applied to the medical profession, dicta in several cases sup-
ported the idea that professions were to be treated differently from or-
dinary businesses.3
The claim that the learned professions are exempt from the Sher-
man Act because they do not engage in "trade or commerce" was
clearly rejected in Goldfarb. The Supreme Court noted that there is
neither a specific exemption for professions on the face of the Sherman
Act, nor any legislative history to indicate that the professions were not
intended to be covered by the terms "trade or commerce.
32
While the Goldfarb Court held that professions are not exempt
from Sherman Act jurisdiction, it did suggest, in what has become one
of its notable footnotes, that restraints on competition in professionals'
activity would not be analyzed according to the same standards as re-
straints on purely commercial activity.
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic
to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions anti-
trust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service as-
pect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of
publicity for the Center, an opinion on the ethical propriety of the Center was sought from the
local Capitol Medical Society. Other communication asserting inadequate physician backup serv-
ice for the Center included a letter to one of the defendants, Dr. Palmer, the Director of the
Florida Board of Medical Examiners. The district court upheld the Noerr-Pennington defense
with respect to communications with Dr. Palmer (though there was only questionable evidence
that the communication was in his official capacity), but held the defense inapplicable to other
conversations, because the TMH ob/gyn staff was not a regulatory body, and neither was the
Capitol Medical Society.
The court subsequently reversed itself and granted summary judgment for the defendants
after finding that the hospital staff and the Capital Medical Society were addressed and petitioned
in their "quasi-governmental" capacity and that consequently Noerr-Pennington applied. Memo-
randum of Decision, No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1976).
30. For a pre-Goldfarb discussion of the learned professions exemption, see Bauer, supra
note 4, at 571-92.
31. See United States v. Oregon Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952); FTC v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
32. 421 U.S. at 786-88. The Court also cited Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7
(1945), and United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950), to
support the proposition that the nature of an occupation, including its public service aspect, by
itself does not determine its exemption vel non from the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. at 787.
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the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We inti-
mate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are
confronted today.33
Despite this qualifying footnote, which implies a "rule of reason"
approach, the Court proceeded to treat the minimum fee schedule as a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.34 The full significance of this foot-
note has yet to be explained by the Supreme Court. Presumably there
are restraints which are illegal per se in the commercial sphere which
are valid restraints when applied in the professional sphere.
Some insight into the analysis the Court may use in differentiating
professional regulation and activity from purely commercial activity
may be gleaned from recent cases challenging advertising restraints.
Though the issues concerning the right to prohibit advertising in Vir-
ginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 35
and in Bates were decided on first amendment grounds, these opinions
closely parallel the "rule of reason" analysis of antitrust cases.3 6
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the pharmacists argued that
price competition resulting from advertising would lower the profes-
sional caliber of pharmacists and jeopardize the health and safety of
the public. The Supreme Court rejected the latter argument, emphasiz-
ing that drugs are standardized products which may be effectively regu-
lated by state agencies that license and regulate their advertisement and
sale.37 Price advertising could not significantly lower the level of phar-
macists' competence because if the products of a certain pharmacist
were to fall below the professionally accepted standard because of price
cutting, the state pharmacy board had the power to revoke the pharma-
cist's license. The Court specifically rejected a paternalistic approach
toward consumers, expressing its confidence that consumers are fully
competent to make an informed choice with respect to both price and
33. 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17.
34. Id. at 780-86. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-18 (1940)
(reasonableness of restraints on trade is irrelevant on the question of guilt). On the other hand,
note this recent statement in Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298
(E.D. Va. 1977): "There is a split of authority as to whether the perse or rule of reason test should
be applied to substantive antitrust claims involving the practices of professions [comparing United
States v. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), with Feminist
Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976)]." 431 F.
Supp. at 304 n.8.
35. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
36. For an articulation of the "rule of reason," see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). For an application of
the "rule of reason" in a professional context, see United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp.
507 (D. Or. 1974), requiring a balancing of "the various harms and benefits occasioned to the
public by the conduct in question." Id. at 516.
37. 425 U.S. at 767-69.
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service if they have the facts.3
In a footnote to its opinion the Court noted that its decision had no
bearing on advertising restrictions on members of other professions,
such as lawyers or physicians. The Court re-emphasized the distinction
noted in Goldfarb between professionals who deal in services and busi-
nessmen who deal in products.39 Chief Justice Burger also emphasized
this distinction in his concurring opinion.4
In Bates, the Court similarly struck down anticompetitive restric-
tions on price advertising of certain standard legal services. The argu-
ments made in support of an advertising ban for the services of
professionals are generally similar to arguments of professionals in sup-
port of anticompetitive restraints alleged to protect professionalism:
namely, that advertising demeans the profession and undermines re-
spect for it; that it destroys the maintenance of professionalism, as dis-
tinguished from the mere conduct of a trade; that it would be
inherently misleading to the public in that it would not provide ade-
quate information relating to the nature of the services advertised; that
it would have undesirable economic effects by increasing prices but
lowering the quality of professional service; and that it would be very
difficult to enforce regulations to protect against misleading advertis-
ing. The Court rejected these arguments, finding that the potential ben-
efits of advertising standard legal services outweighed the predicted
dangers, many of which the Court believed did not exist.4'
It is also important to note that the Court rejected the assertion
that ethical self-discipline of the legal profession would not control ad-
vertising abuse. The Court thought that the profession would best be
served if the professional self-regulation mechanisms actively maintain
and enforce its standards.42
The lower federal courts faced with the task of interpreting
Goldfarb have enunciated a number of different tests for determining
38. Id. at 769-70.
39. Id. at 773 n.25.
40. Id. at 774-75.
41. 433 U.S. at 366-79.
42. Id. at 379, 384.
In both Bates and Virginia Board ofPharmacy, the Court placed heavy emphasis on capabili-
ties of regulatory agencies and professional self-discipline to prevent abuses that might otherwise
result from greater competition. Apparently, the Court assumes that the benefits to be gained by
removing anticompetitive restraints will not adversely affect the quality of professional services
because state agencies and professional societies will enforce proper professional standards. Thus,
the decisions that purport to create a freer market implicitly support more regulation, since a
likely result of increased antitrust enforcement will be a concomitant increase in the level of state
regulation to ensure that the caliber of professional service remains high. See id.; 425 U.S. at 768-
69, 771-72.
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the validity of anticompetitive restrictions on professional activity.
Most of the lower courts have followed the test suggested in the lan-
guage in footnote 17 of Goldfarb, namely, a rule of reason analysis.
The cases approach the issue with the presumption that any anticompe-
titive activity which would be illegal in a commercial case is illegal in
the professional case, unless the presumption is overcome by a showing
that the particular restraint should be permitted because of the benefits
gained by the public.43 If the restraint is perceived by the court as noth-
ing more than a commercial restraint, as in Goldfarb, the presumption
is very close to irrebuttable.4 The analysis of the first amendment cases
suggests that the Supreme Court is not receptive to claims to the valid-
ity of anticompetitive regulations based primarily on the protection of
professional integrity, professional standing and other status considera-
tions. Applying the rule of reason approach, the lower courts have al-
lowed the professions to justify, on the other grounds, restraints which
would be per se illegal if utilized by nonprofessionals. 5
III. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF STATE LICENSURE AND
PROFESSIONAL CONTROL THROUGH MEDICAL PRACTICE
ACTS AND PEER REVIEW MECHANISMS
Medicine is a thoroughly controlled profession. No person may
practice medicine in any part of the United States without a license. 6
Medical licensure began in the early years of the country, and has
43. See, e.g., Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977), where the court held that unless the Dental Association could show benefit to
the public, in the form of improved service, which resulted from its use of monopoly power to
require dentists to be members of the American Dental Association as a condition of membership
in the Arizona Dental Association, the professional group would be in violation of the Sherman
Act.
44. See, e.g., Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977). In Ballard, a group of chiropractors alleged that physicians, medical associations and pri-
vate corporations conspired to bar health insurance coverage for chiropractic services. The court
stated that this restriction was an "alleged restraint and monopolization of a commercial aspect of
the practice of a profession, as distinguished from such other aspects of the professional qualifica-
tions of the practitioner," and held that, "the professional status of the physicians affords them no
defense." 543 F.2d at 1079. Note that despite the irrebuttable presumption of antitrust violation
resulting from the finding that the restraint was purely commercial in character, other anticom-
petitive activity by professionals will be justifiable under the proper circumstances.
45. See, e.g., Veizaga v. National Bd. of Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cases 1 61,274
(N.D. Ill. 1977), where the court found that the challenged certification procedures would be per
se violations in the commercial sense, but instructed the lower court to apply a rule of reason
analysis if the restrictions were held to be noncommercial. See notes 43 & 44 supra and text
accompanying notes 142-144 infra.
46. R. DERBYSHIRE 8. The only general exception to state licensure requirements is for physi-
cians employed by the United States, notably physicians in the armed services and the U.S. Public
Health Service. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18(4) (1975).
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spread until it has become a uniform requirement.47 It is clearly a valid
exercise of the state's police power.48 To become licensed in any state, a
physician must be a graduate of an approved school of medicine or
osteopathic medicine, must be a person of good moral character, and
must pass a state-administered qualifying examination, which is usu-
ally a national examination adopted by the state medical board.49 In
most states, the applicant must also have had clinical training as a resi-
dent for one or two years and must pay a license fee. In many states,
the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, or must have de-
clared his intention to become a citizen. °
The entire licensing process is administered by a state medical
board, generally appointed by the governor from lists of nominees sub-
mitted by the state or county medical societies.5' Until very recently,
the state medical boards consisted entirely of physicians, but in recent
years the laws have changed, and many state boards now have one or
more lay members. 2 In every state, however, the majority of members
are physicians.5 In general, the licensing process has been routinized,
and there appear to be no recent complaints that the process itself has
been abused to limit the number of physicians admitted to practice,
even though certain aspects of it operate to limit admission to the field.
The members of the state medical boards are likely to be older,
more conservative representatives of the medical establishment who
are associated with state and local medical societies.5 4 Absent demon-
strated abuses of authority, their licensing activities--even if effective
in restricting access to medical practice-presumably come within the
state action exemption from the Sherman Act, because in their licens-
47. For a history of medical licensure in America, see R. DERBYSHIRE; R. SHRYOCH, MEDI-
CAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650-1965 (1967).
48. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
49. For a summary of state licensure requirements in tabular form, see LIAISON COMM. ON
GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., DIRECTORY OF ACCREDITED RESIDENCIES 1975-1976, 435-37
(1976). See also R. DERBYSHIRE 18-30. For a detailed study of medical licensure laws and medical
discipline, see GRAD 54-112.
50. The citizenship requirement, though still found in many state laws, is most certainly of no
effect because it is unconstitutional. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (citi-
zenship requirement not "necessary" to the accomplishment of a legitimate and substantial state
purpose held violative of equal protection); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
51. Thirty states provide a role for medical societies in the nomination of board members.
GRAD app. A, table I.
52. Nineteen states now have lay members. GRAD 57, 226 n.14.
53. Most of the boards with lay members have only one or two. Id. 57, 113-14. The profes-
sion itself has long opposed lay membership. R. DERBYSHIRE 37.
54. R. DERBYSHIRE 35.
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ing they carry out functions required by state law.
Restraints of trade are nonetheless implicit in the licensing
scheme. In particular, the requirement that applicants graduate from
approved schools has for many years limited the supply of physicians.
State medical boards generally have the power to "approve" medical
schools, or to accept the judgment of a national accrediting organiza-
tion, namely the American Medical Association, the American Osteo-
pathic Association, or the Association of American Medical Colleges. 6
The limitation of licenses to graduates of approved schools has had its
most visible impact in the case of foreign medical graduates (FMGs).57
The approval of medical schools represents a classic example of
the duality of medical regulation. Competent medical practice is based
on physician education in schools that provide sound training, and
there is evidence that many FMGs lack such training. However, the
limitation of licensure to graduates of approved schools also serves as a
limitation on access to the field. Latent xenophobia in the American
medical establishment aside,58 a desire to limit access may be discerned
in the sharp opposition of the AMA and other medical societies to the
requirement in the 1976 Health Professions Act5 9 that, as a condition of
federal subsidy, medical schools accept American graduates of foreign
medical schools so as to enable them to complete their studies and ful-
55. See note 6 supra and text accompanying notes 5-15 supra.
56. GRAD 61.
57. FMGs presently supply about one-fifth of the medical manpower in this country, though
only three-fifths of them are licensed. The rest supply an essential though less highly paid substra-
tum of medical practice under limited or special licenses in public hospitals and other public
institutions. For a detailed account of the FMG "problem," see Health Manpower Policies Study
Group, School of Public Health, Univ. of Michigan, State Policies on Limited and Temporary
Licensure of Foreign Medical Graduates, Contract No. HRA 106-74-68 (1975). See also Dublin,
Foreign Physicians: Their Impact on U.S. Health Care, 185 SCIENCE 407 (1974). On lower test
scores of FMGs, see INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE COMMITTEE, H.R. REP. No. 266,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-54 (1976); Weiss, Foreign Medical Graduates and the Medical
Underground, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1408 (1974).
The problem of the FMGs, who are generally subject to special license requirements, has
come to congressional attention and was dealt with in part in the Health Professions Educational
Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, 90 Stat. 2243 (amending the Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300e-14a (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), and the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970). The law limits FMG entry into the United States to persons who
can demonstrate adequate knowledge of English, acceptance for training in a school of medicine
and affiliated hospital, and a commitment to return to the country of origin. The limitation on
FMG immigration may be waived, however, until December 31, 1980, if its earlier effectuation
would result in substantial disruption of health services provided by the medical education pro-
gram in which the FMG seeks to participate.
58. See, eg., In re Marburg v. Cole, 286 N.Y. 202, 36 N.E.2d 113 (1941).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 295g-2 (West Supp. 1977) (added by the Health Professions Educational
Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 782, 90 Stat. 2243, 2314 (1976)).
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fill their educational requirements." Indeed, several instances have
been reported in the press of medical schools announcing that they
would forego federal assistance rather than dilute their standards by
accepting FMGs.6 ' While AMA opposition to the liberalizing efforts of
the 1976 law can hardly be the basis for an antitrust claim-because it
is clearly an instance of the first amendment right of petition protected
from Sherman Act claims under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine-there
is a question whether other efforts of the medical societies to limit the
number of medical school graduates are similarly protected.62
A. Professional Discipline Under the Medical Practice Acts.
When a physician has been licensed, he assumes the continuing
obligation to comply with the state's medical practice act and with reg-
ulations promulgated pursuant to the act by the state medical board.
Though the license to practice medicine must be renewed periodically,
license renewal has been primarily a revenue measure; a renewal fee is
collected, but generally no evidence of continued competence to prac-
tice medicine need be shown.63 Since the mid-seventies, a growing
number of states have adopted continuing medical education require-
ments, or have authorized their medical practice boards to require con-
tinuing education.'
The requirements of medical practice laws and regulations differ
from state to state but follow fairly regular categories. Though some
state laws are very detailed and others quite general, they commonly
impose some requirements relating to the physician's continued compe-
tence to practice his profession by providing for revocation or suspen-
sion of the license or for other sanctions in cases of gross
60. For AMA opposition, see Health Manpower Programs.- Hearings on H.A 2956 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment ofthe Comm. on Interstate andForeign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 499, 504, 514 (1975) (statement of Tom E. Nesbitt, M.D.).
61. Eighteen medical schools, including Johns Hopkins, were reported to have rejected gov-
ernment funding so as not to be forced to admit foreign-trained medical students. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 6, 1977, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1977, at 18, col. 6.
62. See United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
63. States differ in their requirements in that annual, biennial or triennial license renewals
are required, but they uniformly require a renewal fee. GRAD 71.
64. Twenty states mention continuing medical education (CME) in their practice acts; in
some the legislature has actually defined and imposed the requirement, while in other states the
legislature has either directed or authorized their medical boards to impose such requirements.
GRAD 71,236 n.95. In seven states the CME provisions are actually in effect. Id. 73. Several states
have delegated the management of the continuing education programs to medical societies, which
will give them a very substantial role in the discipline of the professions when the CME programs
become fully operational. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
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incompetence,65 and, in a growing number of states, in instances where
a physician has become so physically or mentally disabled through old
age, drug or alcohol abuse, or from other causes that his continued
practice may endanger patients or the general public.6 Other require-
ments deal with such matters as "good moral character" or loss of li-
cense for the conviction of a crime, the improper prescription of
narcotic drugs, the performance of illegal abortions, the betrayal of
professional confidences, or the catch-all offense of "unprofessional
conduct," generally interpreted to include some offenses more specifi-
cally enumerated in other state laws.6' Thus, the "unprofessional con-
duct" category will include offenses more often referred to in some
states as advertising, sharing fees with persons not licensed to practice
medicine, aiding and abetting the practice of persons not licensed to
practice medicine, and similar offenses which involve not only elements
of competence in practice but also aspects of economic control.68 These
kinds of offenses generally reflect the requirements of the code of ethics
of the state or county medical society, and can be-and have
been-abused in restraint of trade.69
65. Gross incompetence, variously defined, is a basis for discipline in virtually all of the
states. The problem is generally not in the precise definition of the term, but rather in finding
other physicians willing to testify that a colleague is incompetent. Very few cases based on this
ground have been reported. GRAD 125-28.
66. Some thirty-four states have adopted legislation to deal with the disabled physician. The
laws generally grant the power to the medical board to require a physician to undergo a physical
or mental examination. A variety of probationary remedies and methods for returning the physi-
cian to practice are provided for, and in several states the medical society participates in the exam-
ination or supervision of a disabled physician. Id. 121-25, 164-68.
67. The offenses in this category are: fraud in obtaining a license, including fraud in applica-
tion or examination; advertising; fee-splitting; discipline, revocation or suspension of license in
another state; violation of medical practice act; betrayal of professional secrets; violating privi-
leged communications; assuring permanent cure for an incurable discease; immorality or gross
immorality; misuse of title of M.D. or D.O.; failure to display license; failure to pay annual license
fee; making untruthful or exaggerated claims relating to professional excellence or abilities;
overcharging. Id. 120-21.
68. Id.
69. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (decided under the Civil Rights Act); Arizona
State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Clark, 97 Ariz. 205, 398 P.2d 908 (1965) (license revocation and
loss of society membership based on association with clinic not in good standing because its labor
problems allegedly interfered with the free practice of medicine); Blumenthal v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235-36, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 504-05, 368 P.2d 101, 104-05 (1962); Com-
plete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soe'y, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 205, 272 P.2d 497, 499
(1954) (complaint alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade; the medical society responded with a
cross-complaint charging unlawful corporate practice of medicine, aiding and abetting the lay
practice of medicine, fee-splitting and solicitation; cross-complaint not only alleged harm to the
public health and welfare, but also "an invasion of the property rights of the San Diego County
Medical Society and the individual cross-complainants"). See also American Motor Sales Corp. v.
New Motor Vehicle Bd., 69 Cal. App. 3d 983, 138 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977).
Vol. 1978:443] PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
One commentator has observed that until very recently the impact
of medical practice 'acts on assuring medical competence has been min-
imal.70 Record-keeping and documentation of proceedings of state
medical boards are generally sparse,71 but available evidence indicates
that the question of professional incompetence was not involved in
most of the very small number of license revocations which did occur.72
Professional incompetence is difficult to prove, particularly in light of
the continuing reluctance of physicians to testify against fellow physi-
cians.7 3 As a result, though the competence-related requirements of
state medical practice acts are clearly sound exercises of the police
power to protect the public health and safety-reflecting state action of
the kind that renders their application immune from the application of
the Sherman Actn--their minimal enforcement protects the inside
group of licensees rather than the public for whose protection the sys-
tem has professedly been established.
70. While approximately 325,000 physicians in the United States are licensed to practice
medicine, for the five-year period from 1968 through 1972 only 1,033 formal disciplinary proceed-
ings occurred. Derbyshire, MedicalEthics andDiscoline, 228 J.A.M.A. 59, 61 (1974). Derbyshire,
himself a physician, reports on a five-year survey (1968-1972) of forty-seven states-no data were
available for the remaining three. The 1,033 actions by medical boards resulted in 297 license
revocations, 110 suspensions, 400 probations, 198 reprimands and 28 voluntary surrenders of
licenses. According to Derbyshire, fewer than 0.66% of all physicians had charges brought against
them by medical boards over a ten-year period. Id. Derbyshire's figures match the results of a
nine-state survey (with only eight states responding) undertaken by this author for the year 1976.
The survey found that what is classified and recorded as a "complaint" varies from state to state.
However, even in states with the most complete recording systems, the figures approximate those
of Derbyshire. New York had 1,191 complaints over a 16-month period (about 2% of the physi-
cian population) with only 17 dispositions by the medical board and 6 by the Board of Regents.
Michigan recorded only 15 complaints with 14 dispositions (about .01% of the physician popula-
tion). California received 2,494 complaints and Mississippi reported 7 complaints, but information
was not available on dispositions. GRAD app. B at 4-5.
71. Most medical boards have very small staffs and prepare no annual reports. They gener-
ally do not keep statistics on the number of complaints by source or nature of the charge, and they
just barely keep records of the nature of dispositions. A recent nine-state survey undertaken as
part of a study of medical discipline produced evidence of disorganization in the medical board
offices, with correspondence remaining unanswered or going astray, but little evidence of activity
going back for more than one year. One of the nine states failed to produce any data though
prodded and cajoled over a period of almost a year, claiming first that the data were not readily
available, and then that there was no staff to dig them out. Id. app. B at 1-3.
72. In seven out of the eight states that responded to this author's nine-state survey, see note
70 supra, drug and alcohol abuse and unlawful drug prescription were the most frequent com-
plaints. In New York, one of the eight states, the most frequent complaint was professional mis-
conduct. In all other states, this was the second most common charge, with complaints of fraud,
usually referring to Medicare and Medicaid billing, third. GRAD app. B at 5.
73. Derbyshire, supra note 70, at 60.
74. For a discussion of the state action exemption, see notes 6, 8, 10, 18, 19, 21, 23 and text
accompanying notes 5-24.
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Medical practice act restrictions on advertising are particularly
susceptible to attack on both antitrust and non-antitrust grounds.' For
example, total restraints on advertising have been invalidated on first
amendment grounds in the contexts of fairly standardized legal serv-
ices,75 the sale of drugs and pharmaceuticals,76 and the prescription and
sale of eyeglasses.77 There is no reason why the protection of the first
amendment should not extend to appropriately regulated advertising of
medical services as well.78 Thus, advertising the availability of certain
services-such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and abor-
tion clinics-has been approved in a number of instances.7 9 Further-
more, restraints on medical advertising are likely to encounter severe
Sherman Act attacks. Although the Sherman Act cause of action in
Bates was dismissed due to the state action exemption, the broad ban
on advertising would clearly have violated antitrust law, just as the bar
association minimum fee schedule did in Goldfarb.80 This reading of
Goldfarb is shared by the Federal Trade Commission, which com-
menced proceedings against the AMA in 1975, attacking in particular
the provision of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics which contains what
the FTC has interpreted as an outright prohibition on advertising. 8' As
a private membership organization, the AMA does not share the state
immunity of the integrated state bar in Bates.
Other offenses under the state medical practice acts that involve
economic constraints are not easy to characterize, because some of
them also involve sound elements of patient protection. Some provi-
sions in state medical practice acts that limit and restrain certain of the
arguably commercial aspects of the physician's practice relate to the
prohibition of fee sharing or of engaging in medical practice with
someone not a licensed physician. Cases involving outright fee-splitting
75. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
76. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
77. See, e.g., Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Tex. 1977). See also Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (reference to advertising of glasses).
78. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
79. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (availability of out-of-state abortion services);
Abortion Coalition of Mich., Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Pub. Health, 426 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Mich.
1977). See also Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1977) (optometrist advertising);
Health Sys. Agency of N. Va. v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(right to provide information to medical directory regarding physicians' fees and services is consti-
tutionally protected); Talsky v. Department of Registration and Educ., 68 Ill. 2d 579, 370 N.E.2d
173 (1977) (chiropractor, advertising ban in the medical practice act); Sterling Optical Co. v. Uni-
versity of the State of N.Y., 55 Misc. 2d 852, 287 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
80. See note 8 supra and text accompanying notes 7 & 8 supra.
81. FTC v. American Medical Ass'n, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,068 (1975).
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with a runner or agent, or the participation of an untrained or unli-
censed person in surgery and other treatment commonly raise little
more than police power issues. Both kinds of "sharing" of fees and
activites are undesirable because they may hurt patients in situations
where the patient cannot protect himself. There may, of course, be mar-
ginal cases of physicians allowing highly competent though unlicensed
persons to participate in surgery and the like, but in these situations the
reach of proper regulatory power rather than significant restraints of
trade appears to be involved. Significant issues of restraint of trade are
raised, however, when the law is interpreted to ban partnership or
group practice arrangements between physicians and such allied health
specialists, frequently licensed themselves, as physician's assistants,
physiotherapists, occupational therapists, radiation therapists and
clinical labatory specialists. As in the case of prohibited advertising, the
prohibition is too broad. Perhaps such interdisciplinary arrangements
between physicians and other licensed health specialists will require
regulation, but there is not likely to be any clear evidence that an out-
right prohibition protects patients and serves sound police power objec-
tives.8 2
Though such prohibitions have been subject to antitrust challenge
when they are part of medical society codes of ethics, they have not
been attacked as part of state law or regulation, probably because of
the hurdle posed by the Parker state action exemption.83 At present,
even following Goldfarb and Bates, the anticompetitive impact of a
state law is not grounds for its invalidation. The state action exemption,
however, is clearly unavailable when the state law lacks any colorable
regulatory purpose and is the result of a conspiracy to abuse the legisla-
tive process.' Thus, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,"5 which interpreted the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, held
that "[c]onspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor
may also result in an antitrust transgression.""6 Similarly, in Gibson v.
82. Although the author is unaware of any successful challenges to fee-splitting provisions on
antitrust grounds, the justifications given to support these provisions are hardly more weighty than
those considered in Goldfarb. For a cross-section of justifications on this point, see Magan Medi-
cal Clinic v. California State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249 Cal. App. 2d 124, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256
(1967); Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272 P.2d 497
(1954); Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.), applicationfor
writ of error dismissedfor want of jurisdiction, 389 U.S. 52 (1967).
83. See text accompanying notes 5-24 supra.
84. Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, supra note 4,
at 3-7.
85. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
86. Id. at 513.
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Berryhill,87 the Supreme Court found that an optometrist whose license
was revoked had been denied due process because all the members of
the state licensing board were optometrists in competition with the
plaintiff who had pecuniary interests in the outcome of the case. The
relevance of these decisions to the field of medical discipline is obvi-
ous-medical boards composed primarily of physicians sit in judgment
of other physicians with whom they often compete. It is clear that even
sound regulations may be applied in an abusive and anticompetitive
fashion.88
The state regulatory system of medical discipline has a number of
formal and informal links with the self-administered system of profes-
sional discipline operated by the state and county medical societies. As
noted earlier, the medical practice acts and regulations generally re-
flect, and to some extent duplicate, the codes of professional ethics
adopted by private medical societies. In addition, state laws frequently
require that the governor appoint the members of the state medical
board from lists submitted by the medical societies.89 Under many of
the state laws, the medical societies are also delegated a variety of func-
tions. In some jurisdictions, the medical societies are delegated the task
of operating the continuing medical education program.90 Failure to
complete the necessary educational requirements before the time set for
license renewal may result in the refusal to renew a physician's license.
The medical society's role in the continuing education program pro-
vides another opportunity for abuse; the society can refuse to renew the
license of a physician who has not followed the medical society's poli-
87. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
88. One such instance of abuse may be cited. Although medical license laws have many very
similar requirements and call for the taking of national licensing examinations, reciprocity,
though provided for, is not granted by every state. It is frequently said, though no case law sub-
stantiation is available, that the "sunshine belt" states do not extend reciprocity to physicians from
other parts of the country, and that they apply their otherwise sound licensing laws so as to bar
new competitors wishing to establish practices within the state. The targets of the ban are seasoned
practitioners from other parts of the country with less pleasant climates who wish to spend their
waning years as part-time or semi-retired practitioners in desirable locations, competing with
long-time resident physicians. It would take considerable study of past records-which are not
likely to be available-to establish such a pattern of anticompetitive behavior. See, e.g., Mann v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 31 Cal.'2d 30, 187 P.2d 1 (1947).
89. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Asuz. Rav. STAT. § 32-1429(H) (Supp. 1977-78) (requiring program to be certi-
fied by a medical society or college or university); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-3(E) (1961) (program
must reflect "consensus of the medical community"); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.281 (Page
1977); RI. GEN. LAws § 5-37-2.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also AMA Council on Health Man-
power, Continuing Competence of Physicians, 217 J.A.M.A. 1537 (1971) ("The AMA Council on
Medical Education, with its Advisory Committee on Continuing Medical Education, is responsi-
ble for the codification, review, and accreditation of continuing education programs for physi-
cians." Id. 1537.)
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cies by alleging that he has failed to meet the continuing medical edu-
cation requirements. Although the opportunity for abuse does exist, no
cases challenging the delegation of authority to the medical society, or
charging abuses of that authority, had been reported by late 1977.
Another link between the state board and the medical societies is
the role medical societies play in official disciplinary procedures. In
thirteen states, the medical societies are required by law to report to the
state board that a physician has been the subject of a medical society
disciplinary proceeding. 91 Depending on the nature of the charge and
the circumstances, the matter may be investigated by the state board
which may then proceed to base an official state disciplinary proceed-
ing on the facts disclosed. A few states have gone so far as to delegate
the investigation of complaints of violations of their medical practice
acts to their respective state medical societies,92 and one state has actu-
ally delegated the entire state medical disciplinary function to the med-
ical society.93
Another area in which state and county medical societies play a
significant role is in the control and rehabilitation of physicians who,
by reason of physical or mental illness, old age or drug abuse, including
alcoholism, may create health and safety hazards if permitted to prac-
tice. Under so-called "sick physicians acts" adopted in the majority of
states, provision is made for a variety of rehabilitative efforts, including
both suspension of the license until full capacity to practice has been
demonstrated, and probation, which may involve limitation of the li-
cense to practice or limitation to practice under supervision.94 In some
states, the medical societies play an important role in the probationary
effort, providing the necessary supervision and taking a part in the
process of determining that a physician is again capable of returning to
full and unsupervised practice.95
The development of PSROs adds another significant element to
the close relationship between the official regulatory boards and the
private medical societies in the management of professional conduct.9 6
91. GRAD 204, 272 n.546, app. A, table III.
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-13e(a) (West Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. § 311.595(2)
(1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 130(g) (1971). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2848 to 2851
(Cum. Supp. 1976).
93. In Alabama, the Board of Censors of the State Medical Association sits as the Board of
Medical Examiners. ALA. CODE § 34-24-53 (1975).
94. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.1201 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6511 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977-78); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(b)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1978-79). See also
GRAD 182, 186-87.
95. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN.§ 73-25-55(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-42-
4, 67-42-7(A) (Interim Supp. 1976); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 677.415(2), 677.420(4) (1977).
96. See text accompanying notes 147-76 infra.
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This closeness provides a setting for abuse. Although there are only a
few reported instances of the manipulation of state agencies to limit
competition or to exile from the profession persons who have violated
the private society's code, they indicate that such abuses can occur and
may well be more prevalent than is apparent. 97
The interrelationship of state regulatory agencies and professional
organizations may become more significant in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions. In both Bates and Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the
Court placed heavy emphasis on the capabilities of regulatory agencies
and professional self-discipline to prevent abuse that may result from
greater competition.98 In the future, many of the anticompetitive re-
straints imposed on the learned professions, either by regulatory agen-
cies or by professional societies, which have some stabilizing effect on
the standards of the professions may be held illegal under the antitrust
laws. The Supreme Court assumes that the benefits to be gained by
removing anticompetitive restraints will not adversely affect profes-
sional performance because state agencies and professional societies
will enforce proper professional standards. Thus, the decisions that
purport to create a freer market implicitly support more regulation. As
the restraints on competition are abolished by antitrust enforcement,
the stabilizing effects these restraints may have had on professional per-
formance will have to be replaced by more state regulation to protect
the patient, client or other consumer of professional services. There-
fore, a likely result of increased antitrust activity is a concomitant in-
crease in the level of state regulation to insure that a high caliber of
professional service is maintained. The opinions in Goldfarb and Bates
both concluded by reminding the states that these decisions did not
affect the states' right to regulate the learned professions. This suggests
that the Court realized that increased state regulation might be neces-
sary to offset any detriment that might be caused by abusive profes-
sional competition.
B. Professional Self-Discplline Administered by Medical Societies.
The strong influence of the professional organizations in the disci-
plinary scheme is already evident in roles they play in the state regula-
tory scheme. The great and dominant national medical society is the
97. See, e.g., Arizona State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Clark, 97 Ariz. 205, 398 P.2d 908
(1965); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (1976). See also
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Sterling Optical Co. v. University of the State of N.Y., 55
Misc. 2d 852, 287 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1968); State Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners v. Berberian,
200 Pa. Super. Ct. 533, 190 A.2d 330 (1963); Harang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 400 S.W.2d 810 (rex.
Civ. App. 1966).
98. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
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American Medical Association, probably one of the most influential
special-interest groups in the nation. Its membership numbers 203,000
out of a total of some 325,000 practicing physicians in the country.99 As
the primary spokesman for the medical profession, it has sought to pro-
tect the financial interests of its members by affecting the shape of med-
ical and public health legislation throughout the nation. A generally
conservative organization, it opposed Medicaid and Medicare legisla-
tion and acquiesced in it only when the expensive fee-for-service ap-
proach, rather than a capitation approach, was written into the law. °°
It long opposed Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) legislation
and acquiesced in it only when fairly onerous conditions were imposed
on HMOs and when it became apparent the HMO legislation would be
a good device to postpone the consideration of national health insur-
ance.10 Most recently, the AMA opposed major provisions of the
Health Professions Education Assistance Act of 1976,102 particularly
provisions which would have required physicians educated with federal
assistance to serve for a period of time in parts of the nation that expe-
rience physician shortages. 10 3 The AMA also opposed adoption of the
PSRO legislation until the influence of the state medical societies was
assured. '4
The AMA, as the voice of organized medicine, is represented on
virtually all of the boards and governing bodies of the national societies
that have an interest in medical licensure or the regulation of medical
practice, including the Federation of State Medical Boards, an organi-
zation that reflects the interests of all state medical licensing agencies.
One of the most important roles played by the AMA is its membership,
together with the American Hospital Association, on the Joint Com-
mission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).10° As a JCAH
99. Information provided by a member of the Membership Development Office of the AMA,
Chicago, Illinois (telephone interview, May 1978).
100. For a contemporary account of AMA opposition to Medicare, see M. GREENFIELD,
HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED: THE 1965 PROGRAM FOR MEDICARE 95-100 (1966). See also
M. GREENFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: THE 1965 AND 1967 SOCIAL SECURITY AMEND-
MENTS 77-104 (1968).
101. See, eg., Hearings on Health Maintenance Organization Amendments Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess.
578-89 (1975-76) (statement of Edgar T. Beddington, Jr., M.D.).
102. Pub. L. No. 94-484, 90 Stat. 1945 (1976).
103. See Hearings on Health Manpower Programs Before the Subcommn on Health and the
Environment of the House Comn on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 499-
524 (1975) (statement of Tom E. Nesbitt, M.D.).
104. See Hearings on the Implementation ofPSRO Legislation Before the Subcommn on Health
of the Senate Comm, on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 59-82 (Pt. 1) (1974) (statement of Russel
Roth, M.D.).
105. See text accompanying notes 117-18 infra.
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member, the AMA exercises major influence over the standards and
services of hospitals in the nation. This influence also affects specializa-
tion training. In order to qualify in specialty areas, a physician must
obtain such training in "accredited" hospitals, le., hospitals accredited
by the JCAH, in a residency program accredited by the Liaison Com-
mittee on Graduate Medical Education, which is composed of repre-
sentatives of the AMA, the American Hospital Association, the
American Board of Medical Specialties, the Association of American
Medical Colleges and the Council on Medical Specialty Societies. 10 6
The AMA is regarded as the parent organization of all state medi-
cal societies, and through them, of all county medical societies. The
Code of Medical Ethics adopted by the AMA is the code followed by
state societies. Although the AMA provides its members and its constit-
uent organizations with a great deal of information and advice on pro-
fessional disciplinary matters, it does not involve itself directly in
disciplinary proceedings, thus leaving each state and county society to
operate its own disciplinary mechanism.
State and county medical societies generally apply the AMA Code
of Professional Ethics, including its ban on advertising and its ban on
practicing with persons not licensed to practice medicine. Although
organized medicine, like other professions, resists external regulation
by government agencies by asserting that a learned profession is capa-
ble of policing itself, very little evidence suggests that it does. While
statistics on the activities of state medical boards are slight and unim-
pressive,0 7 national statistics on professional self-discipline by medical
societies are virtually non-existent.10 8
Although in many states professional discipline by medical socie-
ties must be reported to the state medical board and may trigger official
action, professional discipline administered by medical societies them-
selves is necessarily very limited in scope and in sanctions. In general,
medical societies are limited to dealing with the professional discipline
of their own members, and the heaviest sanction that a society can im-
pose is suspension or termination of membership. The sanction has a
different impact in different parts of the country. In large metropolitan
settings, ouster from the county medical society, though professionally
harmful, is far less damaging than a similar sanction imposed in a
106. LIsON COMM. ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., supra note 49, at 5, 7.
107. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
108. Derbyshire, supra note 70, at 60. The most recent figures available are for 1968, when
thirty-three state medical societies reported no disciplinary procedures at all. For several years, the
AMA requested that medical societies report disciplinary actions but the project was terminated in
1969 by the AMA Department of Medical Ethics which considered it "a waste of time." Id.
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small town or semi-rural setting with few physicians and a single small
hospital to serve the community. In such a setting, the sanction has
long carried with it a measure of professional ostracism and probably a
loss of staff privileges at the local hospital. The impact of ouster from
the medical society is primarily economic, since both association with
other physicians and the privilege to place patients in the local hospital
are necessary to conduct a full medical practice.10 9 Because of this ef-
fect on state-licensed professionals, medical society disciplinary pro-
ceedings have sometimes been characterized as "state action" for
procedural purposes, requiring the full panoply of procedural due
process. At a minimum, even when not regarded as state action, the
potential impact on the physician's practice of disciplinary proceedings
has caused courts to require at least an unbiased panel and a full meas-
ure of fairness in the proceedings."
0
Anticompetitive aspects of the AMA-sponsored code of profes-
sional ethics have long provided the basis for antitrust litigation. In
American Medical Association v. United States,"' the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of the AMA and others for conspiring to violate
the Sherman Act. The defendants were convicted of obstructing the op-
eration of a prepaid medical care and hospitalization plan, Group
Health Association, Inc. The plan had hired physicians and contracted
for hospital facilities, in violation of the associational and independent
practice provisions of the code of ethics. The AMA and the other de-
fendants had, in pursuance of the code of ethics, dissuaded physicians
109. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 165-67, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 623, 626-27, 460 P.2d 495, 498-99 (1969). See also Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical
Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623,636-37, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 688-89 (1974); Westlake Community Hosp.
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 17 CaL 3d 465, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410 (1976).
The leading and most frequently cited case on the subject of impact of medical society member-
ship on hospital affiliation is Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soe'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d
791 (1961), in which a highly qualified osteopathic physician, though fully licensed, was denied
membership in the local medical society without adequate explanation and subsequently was de-
prived of hospital privileges. The court's assistance was also successfully sought in another, factu-
ally similar case, Kurk v. Medical Soe'y of the County of Queens, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 790 (Sup. Ct.
1965). However, some courts have refused to intervene when there was no showing of a formal
relationship between hospital privileges and membership in the medical society or evidence of
medical society control of access to hospital privileges, or where there was no showing of eco-
nomic necessity for judicial intervention. See e.g., Pima County Medical Soe'y v. Felland, 115
Ariz. 311, 565 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1977); Maricopa County Medical Soe'y v. Blende, 5 Ariz. App.
454, 427 P.2d 946 (1967); Schooler v. Tarrant County Medical Soe'y, 457 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1970).
110. In re Smith, 10 Wend. 449 (N.Y. 1833); Glauber v. Patof, 183 Misc. 400,47 N.Y.S.2d 762
(1944). See also Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116
Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 681 (1974); Fried v. Straussman, 82 Misc. 2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
111. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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from accepting employment with the health care plan and from provid-
ing it with consulting services.
Because the AMA case was brought under section 3 of the Sher-
man Act which prohibits anticompetitive conduct in the District of Co-
lumbia, its applicability was regarded as limited for some time, and few
actions of.a similar nature were brought prior to Goldfarb. The finding
in Goldfarb that a state minimum fee schedule affected interstate com-
merce opened up much of the field of medical regulation to potential
federal antitrust prosecution.
Other limitations of an associational and economic nature have
been dealt with in the courts. Requiring membership in a national pro-
fessional association as a condition of admission to the local profes-
sional association (which provided the practitioner with important
services and information) was found to be an anticompetitive tying ar-
rangement in violation of the Sherman Act, where no benefit to the
public results from such an arrangement. 2 It might be added that the
closely interlocking arrangements of organized medicine may well raise
questions analogous to those raised in Associated Press v. United
States,1 1 3 where organizational arrangements themselves gave rise to
antitrust liability. The bylaws of the Associated Press prohibited selling
news to non-members, and each member had the right to block from
membership any non-member competitor. As the dissent pointed out,
there was no evidence that Associated Press had a monopoly, domi-
nated the field, fixed prices or engaged in coercive or other predatory
practices. However, the nature of the bylaws and the organizational
structure itself was, in the opinion of the majority, sufficient to consti-
tute a restraint of trade. Similar considerations might well apply to lo-
cal medical societies that require membership in national societies or
exercise control over hospital affiliations, thus limiting the source or
market for their members' purchase or sale of services.
C. Medical Self-Discipline in the Hospital.
The system of discipline imposed on physicians by the hospitals in
which they practice also has important consequences. There was less
concern over the physician's performance when hospitals were immune
from suit by reason of governmental or charitable immunities. 14 Then,
too, prior to the decision in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
112. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977).
113. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
114. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 980 n.96, 993 n.32 (4th ed. 1971).
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Hospital,115 physicians practicing within a hospital were generally re-
garded as independent contractors, and no responsibility for their pro-
fessional mistakes devolved upon the hospital.' 16 With the advent of
hospital liability, however, hospitals have assumed responsibility for
the care of the patient. In consequence, they began to pay considerably
greater attention to physician performance within the hospital and to
adopt systems of peer review and medical discipline which had in ear-
her days been limited largely to teaching hospitals.
Another source of physician discipline within hospitals is the set of
standards of the JCAH which began to include requirements for review
of the physician's practice within the hospital in 1965, after the enact-
ment of the Medicaid and Medicare law which set requirements for
"participating hospitals." These requirements could be met either by
having a state certifying agency certify substantial compliance, or by
relying on the provision of the federal law that "an institution shall be
deemed to meet the requirements . . . if such institution is accredited
as a hospital by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospi-
tals."'1 17 This provision had the effect of moving JCAH accreditation
into new areas covered by federal law, including such matters as the
quality of the services within the hospital and aspects of utilization re-
view.' 18
Because hospitals are now responsible and liable for the perform-
ance of the physicians within institutions, they must exercise great care
in selecting physicians for employment and in extending staff privileges
to physicians for the treatment of private patients. Consequently, great
care may be taken by the medical staff in evaluating a physician's edu-
cation and experience before granting privileges. Often only limited
privileges are granted during a period of probation, and even when a
physician obtains full privileges he is subject to staff rules on consulta-
tion, his records may be reviewed periodically and his patients may be
included in clinical rounds. If a physician's professional work does not
meet minimum standards, privileges may be denied at the outset, de-
nied renewal or revoked." 9 The non-renewal or revocation of privi-
115. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
116. See, e.g., Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 559, 68 So. 30, 33 (1915);
Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 318, 15 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1938). It should be noted that the in-
dependent contractor doctrine had earlier been applied both to employed staff physicians and to
attending physicians who had been granted "privileges" at the hospital to treat their own patients.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1970).
118. See generally JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, PROGRAM OF Hos-
PITAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS OV 7-8 (1976).
119. The physician's performance within the hospital is generally subject to review by medical
staff committees, such as medical audit committees that review patient records for compliance
with standards, C. EISELE, THE MEDICAL STAFF IN THE MODERN HOSPITAL 180 (1967), and tissue
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leges may have far-reaching consequences for a physician, because no
other hospital in the area is likely to grant him privileges either, and his
record may follow him elsewhere if he tries to relocate.
Because of their great professional importance to physicians, with
regard to both professional standards and economic impact on earn-
ings, hospital privileges enjoy substantial legal protection. Under
JCAH recommendations, privileges are not to be denied or revoked
without a hearing, usually before the governing board of the hospital,
and staff bylaws must be adopted and followed where applicable. 20
Since governing boards usually consist of laymen, members are not
likely to question the judgment of medical staff committees; hence re-
view boards are not likely to provide great protection to a physician
whose competence has been disapproved by his medical colleagues.
The issue of the "right" to staff privileges has increasingly occupied the
courts since the late sixties,' 2' and has become the subject of some state
legislation. 122
committees that supervise the necessity for, and the quality of, surgery, Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals, Bull. 21, Tissue Committee ofa Hospital Medical Staff (1959). For a
case upholding revocation or suspension of privileges for inadequate medical performance, see
Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d 186 (1977).
120. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPrrALS 81-82 (1976).
121. Although the privilege against unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory de-
nial or revocation has long enjoyed protection in public hospitals, see, e.g., Ware v.
Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 187-88, 280 S.W.2d 234, 236 (1955); Milford v. People's Community
Hosp. Auth., 380 Mich. 49, 57, 155 N.W.2d 835, 841-42 (1968), it is now fully recognized in private
hospitals as well, with judicial recognition of the fact that private hospitals serve particular com-
munities under public charter and operate increasingly with public money. They are generally
regarded, therefore, as engaged in "state action." See, e.g., Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Hosp.
Center, 234 Cal. App. 2d 377, 44 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw.
475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); McElhinney v. William Booth Memorial
Hosp., 544 S.W.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. Ky. 1976); Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418,
231 A.2d 389 (1967); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 76 N.J. Super. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (L. Div.
1962), afl'd, 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio
App. 2d 246,48 Ohio Ops. 2d 371,250 N.E.2d 892 (1969). But see Davis v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (1969) (private hospital's policy of no staff obstetricians
and gynecologists held valid); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966)
("authorities of a private hospital are vested with broad discretionary powers in the selection of its
medical and surgical staffs" 217 A.2d at 40).
122. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§ 16-12.1-5-1 (Bums 1973) (hospitals must have reasonable
regulations and cannot discriminate among schools of medicine); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1301
(West 1974) (nonprofit hospitals may not discriminate against physicians who participate in medi-
cal group practice, may not require membership in a specialty body or medical society as prereq-
uisite to the granting of staff privileges); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-8-12 (1974) (protection of the
rights of osteopathic surgeons); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 206-a (Consol. 1976) (protection of
those physicians involved in medical group practice and nonprofit health insurance plans); OR.
REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 441.077 (1977) (hospitals cannot discriminate among schools of medicine
under penalty of revocation of license); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 34-8-8 (1977) (county hospi-
tals cannot discriminate among schools of medicine).
PROFESSION,4L DISCIPLINE
In dealing with actions to review the denial or loss of staff privi-
leges, courts generally have required that the physician be given the
due process requirements of notice and hearing and be judged by ra-
tional and reasonable standards. Standards must be limited to matters
of professional competence, and vague, unrelated requirements that are
subject to abuse will be invalidated. For example, a requirement that
staff members be "temperamentally and psychologically suited for co-
operative staff hospital functions" has been rejected. 23
Physicians who had lost or been denied the renewal of staff privi-
leges were able, in the past, to relocate and continue their incompetent
practice elsewhere. Hospitals, too, were often willing to allow a physi-
cian to resign voluntarily to avoid going through the trouble of a for-
mal revocation proceeding. To prevent incompetent physicians from
continuing in practice by changing hospital affiliations, state medical
practice acts in a growing number of states now require hospitals to
report to the medical board whenever disciplinary action is taken, par-
ticularly when hospital privileges are revoked or limited, thus provid-
ing an opportunity to use hospital disciplinary action as a device to
trigger investigation by the state board.12 4
While the system of medical discipline in the hospital is most im-
portant for patient protection, it is potentially subject to abuse precisely
because it has such far-reaching consequences on a physician's career
and livelihood. In areas where the local medical society and the staff of
the only hospital in the community are closely interlocked, it will be
impossible for a physician to run counter to the estitblished medical
interests unless he is prepared to take the matter to court. While legal
protections may prevent the arbitrary denial of staff privileges, the
practical considerations are likely to dictate a physician's professional
conduct. There is at least some evidence that local medical societies use
the physician's fear of losing hospital privileges as a device to pressure
him and to prevent him from providing services in other institutions
123. Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1962). See also Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr.
681 (1974). In Ascherman, an apparently highly qualified surgeon was simultaneously deprived of
privileges at five hospitals. No charges relating to his competence were raised, but questions were
raised within the medical society relating to his professional conduct and judgment after he had
taken a stand in favor of Medicare and had expressed strong opposition to the posture of the
American Society of Internal Medicine on the subject. The court found that the hospitals had
acted improperly in depriving the surgeon of privileges without explanation, but somewhat unac-
countably failed to find evidence of a conspiracy--though the loss of privileges at all of the hospi-
tals was virtually simultaneous. Sound grounds for refusing to grant privileges will be upheld,
however, such as a failure by the physician seeking privileges to have completed an AMA-ap-
proved internship. Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 48 App. Div. 2d 684, 367 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (1975).
124. GRAD 225, 227 n.614.
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not favored by the society.125 Of the relatively few court cases challeng-
ing the loss of hospital privileges, most arose in small communities
where both medical societies and hospitals were involved in situations
raising questions of economic boycott.' 26
D. Medical Discipline and Medical Specialties. Specialty Boards.
Modem medical practice is characterized by specialization, but
unlike medical licensure for the practice of medicine generally, spe-
cialty certification is controlled by specialty boards. These boards are
private, nonprofit organizations without any governmental authority.
By controlling access to an increasingly important part of the medical
profession, the specialty boards wield significant power.' 27
There are at present twenty-two specialty boards which establish
standards and control certification for their respective specialties.' 28
The work of these boards is coordinated by the American Board of
Medical Specialties (ABMS), which seeks to prevent duplication of ac-
tivities among the boards, recognizes new specialty boards, speaks for
the interests of medical specialty boards generally and serves as a con-
trol organization for the consideration of self-regulation of specialty
practice.
125. See, eg., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1266-
67 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
126. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
127. Though in 1975-76 only 46% of physicians not in training included in the national regis-
try of physicians (maintained by AMA) were diplomates of a specialty board, the recent trend is
for most medical graduates to seek specialty training. AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIAL-
TIES, ANNUAL REPORT 1975-76, at 22.
128. AMERICAN BOARD OF ALLERGY AND IMMUNOLOGY, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (1977);
AMERICAN BOARD OF ANESTHESIOLOGY, INC., BOOKLET OF INFORMATION (1977); AMERICAN
BOARD OF COLON AND RECTAL SURGERY, INC., GENERAL INFORMATION (July 1977); AMERICAN
BOARD OF DERMATOLOGY, INC., BOOKLET OF INFORMATION (1976); AMERICAN BOARD OF FAM-
ILY PRACTICE, GENERAL INFORMATION (1978); AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, POL-
ICIES AND PROCEDURES (July 1976); AMERICAN BOARD OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGERY, INC.,
BOOKLET OF INFORMATION (Mar. 1, 1977); AMERICAN BOARD OF NUCLEAR MEDICINE, INC., IN-
FORMATION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (1977); AMERICAN BOARD OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNE-
COLOGY, INC., BULLETIN FOR 1977 (Aug. 1976); AMERICAN BOARD OF ORTHOPOEDIC SURGERY,
INC., RULES AND PROCEDURES (1977); AMERICAN BOARD OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY, BOOKLET Or
INFORMATION (Jan. 1977); AMERICAN BOARD OF PEDIATRICS, INC., BOOKLET OF INFORMATION
(July 1, 1976); AMERICAN BOARD OF PHYSICAL MEDICINE AND REHABILITATION, BOOKLET OF
INFORMATION (1976); AMERICAN BOARD OF PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., BOOKLET OF INFORMATION
(1976-77); AMERICAN BOARD OF PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE, INC., BULLETIN(13th ed. 1976);
AMERICAN BOARD OF PSYCHIATRY AND NEUROLOGY, INC., INFORMATION FOR APPLICANTS
(Nov. 1, 1975); AMERICAN BOARD OF RADIOLOGY, BOOKLET OF INFORMATION (1977); AMERICAN
BOARD OF SURGERY, INC., BOOKLET OF INFORMATION (July 1, 1976); AMERICAN BOARD OF THO-
RACIC SURGERY, INC., BOOKLET OF INFORMATION (Jan. 1977); AMERICAN BOARD OF UROLOGY,
INC., CANDIDATES' INFORMATION (24th ed. 1977).
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
Board certification gives a physician both privileges and liabilities.
It provides greater professional status and the economic benefits of in-
creased patient referrals and easier access to hospital privileges. It also
subjects physicians to higher standards of practice applicable to the
particular specialties. 129
The primary function of most specialty boards has been to provide
credentials and to certify physicians in specialties by administering an
examination and reviewing the completion of residency requirements.
All specialty boards require that a candidate complete an approved
residency in his specialty. Residencies are approved by the Liaison
Committee on Graduate Medical Education of the American Medical
Association. The examination of specialties follows the "Essentials for
Approval of Examining Boards in Medical Specialties"-guidelines
which are issued jointly by the American Board of Medical Specialties
and the AMA Council on Medical Education, through its Liaison
Committee for Specialty Boards. 130 Thus, the AMA is significantly in-
volved in all phases of specialty certification.
Specialty certification requirements place considerable stress on
thorough clinical training; the length of residency required varies from
three to five years of post-medical school training. In addition, some
boards require further periods of practice in the specialty, ranging from
six months to two years, following the completion of the residency.'
In most specialties, however, an applicant becomes eligible to take the
certification examination when he finishes his residency. In addition to
the written examination, fifteen specialty boards require an oral or
practical examination, or both.' 32
The certification process appears to be a valuable and thorough
method of qualifying specialists. Once a specialist has been certified,
however, most specialty boards are not involved with assuring contin-
ued competence. Though grounds for revocation of certificates exist,
few have ever been revoked; the grounds are generally limited to mis-
representations or failures to make appropriate disclosures in the origi-
129. For an excellent discussion of the certification process see Wallace, supra note 4.
130. LIAISON COMM. ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDuc., supra note 49, at 367-434.
131. This additional practice period is required by the American Boards of Neurological Sur-
gery, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Orthopedic Surgery, Plastic Surgery and Urology. GRAD 88, 243
n.157.
132. The Boards requiring an oral examination are: Anesthesiology; Colon and Rectal Sur-
gery; Dermatology; Neurological Surgery; Obstetrics and Gynecology; Ophthalmology; Otolaryn-
gology; Pediatrics; Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation; Plastic Surgery; Psychiatry and
Neurology; Radiology; Surgery; Thoracic Surgery; Urology. Note also that the American Board of
Internal Medicine requires an oral examination only for its subspecialty board on cardiovascular
disease. Id. 89, 243 n.l59.
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nal application-situations in which the certificate would not have
been issued in the first instance had the full facts been known. Some
boards provide for revocation of the certificate when a physician's li-
cense is revoked, 133 and several provide for revocation upon conviction
of a felony or serious misdemeanor. 34 Two boards list suspension or
expulsion from a medical society as grounds for revocation, 35 and sev-
eral boards include as grounds failure to maintain moral, ethical or
professional standards.136 Only two boards, Family Practice and Urol-
ogy, mention incompetence as a ground for revocation. 37 There ap-
pears to be a growing concern over the maintenance of competency,
however, because eleven of the twenty-two boards have taken some ac-
tion toward the development of a recertification program, and some
others have endorsed the concept.' 38
The process of specialty certification, and the role of the specialty
boards in the process, are entirely self-contained, without any govern-
mental input. While in theory the boards do not control specialty prac-
tice because as a matter of law any physician can practice in any
specialty area, in fact the situation is different. As both an economic
matter and a matter of professional standing, board certification is
enormously important; otherwise it would not be sought after so fre-
quently and energetically. Moreover, many state laws require board
certification for a physician to provide certain services,' 39 and, although
133. Those providing for such revocation are the American Boards of Dermatology, Or-
thopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Preventive Medicine, Psychiatry and Neurology, Radiology,
Thoracic Surgery and Urology. Id. 92, 244 n.171.
134. Those providing for such revocation are the American Boards of Dermatology, Otolaryn-
gology, Radiology, and Thoracic Surgery. Id. 92, 244 n.172.
135. The American Boards of Ophthalmology and Obstetrics and Gynecology list suspension
from a local, regional or national organization of professional peers as evidence of a violation of
standards of ethical practice, one of the grounds for revocation of a certificate. Id. 92, 244 n.173.
136. The American Boards of Anesthesiology, Obstetrics and Gynecology, and Urology. Id.
92, 244 n.174.
137. Id. 92, 244 n.175, 245 n.176.
138. Eleven of the twenty-two boards have indicated in their literature that they have taken
some action towards recertification: American Boards of Allergy and Immunology, Colon and
Rectal Surgery, Family Practice, Internal Medicine, Neurological Surgery, Nuclear Medicine,
Ophthalmology, Otolaryngology, Preventive Medicine, Surgery and Thoracic Surgery. Three
boards have actually initiated mandatory recertification programs: Family Practice, Surgery and
Thoracic Surgery. Three boards have instituted voluntary recertification programs: Allergy and
Immunology, Internal Medicine and Ophthalmology. The others are still in the planning stages.
See generally Id. 92-96; authorities cited at note 128 supra.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3501(5) (McKinney Supp. 1977): "'Radiologist'
means a person duly licensed to practice medicine in the state of New York and who is certified by
the American Board of Radiology in radiology or by the American Osteopathic Board of Radiol-
ogy"; id. § 3501(7): "'Health Physicist' means a person who is certified by the American Board of
Health Physics or The American Board of Radiology in physics"; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
421.10(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978-79):
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Medicare-Medicaid regulations do not require certification, the federal
standards for staff qualification indirectly confirm that it is impor-
tant."4° Specialty certification is a voluntary procedure, and specialty
boards play an important role in the initial evaluation of specialists'
competence. In effect, the specialty boards, composed exclusively of
physician members who are themselves specialists in their respective
areas, control access to the field by their specialty certification. This, in
turn, has made the specialty boards a prime target for antitrust enforce-
ment.
The standards imposed by specialty boards appear to be substan-
tial and their relevance to general specialty practice and patient protec-
tion is usually clear.14 1 However, it is unclear whether the long periods
of internship and practice required before a certificate is granted are
designed to limit access as well as to provide professional training. That
the entire process of specialty certification is closely controlled by the
leading professional societies creates a potential for abuse. Yet despite
the apparent possibility that the self-certification mechanism may vio-
late the antitrust laws, few reported cases document specific instances
of restraints of trade.
The question whether a particular entry barrier in a certification
scheme involves a violation of the Sherman Act was presented in
Veizaga v. National Boardfor Respiratory Therapy14 2 where certain test
requirements of the National Board for Respiratory Therapy were
Physicians who are legally authorized to practice medicine and surgery in other
states . . . and who apply for trainin& and certification in special departments of
medicine and surgery in institutions in this Commonwealth recognized by the board with
advice and consultation with the various examining boards in medical specialties ap-
proved by the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association as
proper for such training, shall receive a graduate certificate that is limited to such train-
mg.... Any person who has been certified in a specialty discipline recognized by the
board, and who makes an application for licensure to practice medicine and surgery
without restriction in the Commonwealth,. . . may be given a qualifying examination.
140. "Under no circumstances is the accordance of staff membership or professional privileges
in the hospital dependent solely upon certification, fellowship, or membership in a specialty body
or society. All qualified candidates are considered by the credentials committee." 20 C.F.R. §
405.1023(e)(4) (1977) (emphasis added).
141. Courts will not interfere with the determinations of private accrediting agencies or as-
sociations, either on due process or antitrust grounds, if the determination is based on substantial
evidence and is not arbitrary or unreasonable, and if it is reasonably related to the legitimate
professional purposes of the accrediting association. As reflected in the cases, such a legitimate
professional purpose must include a measure of public benefit or protection. See, e.g., Marlboro
Corp. v. Association of Independent Colleges & Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1977);
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Rockland Inst. v. Association of
Independent Colleges & Schools, 412 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Kronen v. Pacific Coast
Soe'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965); Salter v. New York Psy-
chological Ass'n, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 100, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964).
142. 1977-1 Trade Cases 1 61,274 (N.D. IlM. 1977).
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challenged under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The court re-
viewed the test practices and remanded for a determination of the na-
ture of the activity regulated. In the court's view, if the activity is
commercial, a per se rule of Sherman Act liability should be applied.
On the other hand, if the activity is professional or non-commercial,
then the rule of reason should be applied to the specific facts of the
case. The rule of reason examination is clearly the more appropriate
approach to examining the impact of medical specialty certification
standards.
The inbreeding encouraged by certification requirements which, in
addition to requiring specific training, limit internships to certain ap-
proved institutions has also provoked litigation. In United States Dental
Institute v. American Association of Orthodontists,4 3 the operators of a
private dental school sued the specialty association of orthodontists, the
American Dental Association and its officers. The plaintiff school
taught orthodonty skills to general practice dentists by giving monthly
three-day seminars over a period of five years, thus allowing practicing
dentists to acquire specialist skills without dropping out of practice to
attend school. It charged that the defendants had conspired to destroy
the school in order to restrict the number of practitioners of orthodonty
and protect the defendants' monopolistic position. The activities
charged included efforts to prevent the State of Illinois from issuing its
approval and charter to the school; efforts to have the state approval
and charter revoked; issuance of guidelines for continuing dental edu-
cation which eliminated plaintiff school from the defendants' list of ap-
proved educational programs; refusal to publish listings of plaintiff's
courses and lists of qualified faculty members in publications con-
trolled by the defendants; and issuance of an advisory opinion that it
was unethical for an Association-certified orthodontist to participate as
a faculty member in an educational program not approved by the Asso-
ciation. Individual dentists claimed that they had been unable to re-
ceive training in orthodonty elsewhere, and that their incomes had
thereby been reduced because they had been forced to refer all
orthodonty patients. In upholding the cause of action for group boycott
against a motion to dismiss, the court noted that the defendants could
not assert that they were merely setting and upholding professional
standards for public protection when they were adopting restrictive
standards to prevent general practice dentists from performing
orthodonty and at the same time preventing them from getting training
in orthodonty. This holding is clearly applicable to specialty certifica-
143. 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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tion in other professions. If a specialty board insists on certain kinds of
training which it controls, it may not then place additional limits on
access to such training or boycott analogous training which it does not
control. 144
The specialty boards have become a frequent target of the FTC in
recent years, and several actions against specialty organizations and
boards have ended in consent decrees.' 45 It is noteworthy that none of
these decrees dealt with matters of competency or professional certifi-
cation. They were limited to clearly economic controls, such as the dis-
tribution and compilation of relative value fee scales, price fixing and
deprivation of consumer information. In a recent complaint, the Amer-
ican Dental Association also was charged with the latter two economic
controls as well as with efforts to retard the development of innovative
dental delivery systems. 146
E. Medical Disc#pline and Federal Legislation: PSROs.
Under Medicare and Medicaid, both enacted in 1965,14 1 the fed-
eral government spends over thirty-one billion dollars annually for
medical care.' 48 With government spending very substantial amounts
of public funds for health care, its regulatory concerns have, for some
time, justifiably addressed matters of cost and quality control, to ensure
that government reimburses only for necessary services of good quality
actually rendered, in order to reduce costs and conserve scarce re-
sources. 149
144. In rendering its decision, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act because the boycott would affect interstate commerce. Id. at 576-77. The court also
disposed of the asserted "learned profession exemption", id. at 579-80, and of a motion, based on
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, to strike the part of the complaint that alleged interference with
the right to petition public authorities. The court relied on California Motor Transp. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), where the Supreme Court found that the doctrine did not save a
defendant where there was an intent to interfere in a business relationship of a competitor, and
where the appeal to public authorities was shown to be in bad faith. 396 F. Supp. at 581-83.
145. See, e.g., The American College of Radiology, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,236 (Mar.
1, 1977); American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and American Academy of Orthopedic
Surgeons, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,171 (Dec. 14, 1976).
146. American Dental Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,255 (Jan. 4, 1977).
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 9 5 -13 9 5pp, 1396-1396i (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
148. Current expenditures for health care amount to almost eight percent of the gross national
product. For fiscal 1977, total federal expenditures for Medicare were $21,549,000,000, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIscAL YEAR 1979, at 181, and federal contributions to
Medicaid amounted to $9,713,287,000. Id. app. 416.
149. Since Medicare and Medicaid are systems in which government, as a third-party payer,
provides payment for services incurred by patients on a fee-for-service basis, cost and quality
controls are of crucial significance, because the patient has little interest in limiting costs and
insufficient knowledge to monitor quality. On cost and quality control problems in relation to
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Federal law and regulation have established a number of mecha-
nisms designed to achieve cost and quality control. Unlike other disci-
plinary mechanisms, these are not intended to secure compliance with
the state medical practice acts, except insofar as they require physicians
to perform with at least minimal professional competence. However,
these federally established mechanisms, currently embodied in the
PSROs, will provide data that could be used in, or that could trigger,
state disciplinary proceedings. 5 The PSRO system is an extension of
professional peer review'5 which is intended to replace another
scheme of peer review built into Medicare and Medicaid, namely the
system of "utilization review."
152
PSROs, see Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The
Role oftPSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 6, 9-13 (1975).
150. See text accompanying notes 63-98 supra . Aside from PSROs, federal law relating to
third-party payment under Medicare and Medicaid provides remedies for abuses and frauds to
deal with such matters as intentional over-billing, billing more than once for a service, billing for
services not performed, or billing for services rendered not because they were necessary but for the
sake of increasing the bill. Remedies for abuse and fraud include recoupment of excessive pay-
ments, 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg (1970); suspension or termination of physicians from the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(d) (1970); criminal prosecution for fraud, 42 U.S.C. §§
1395nn, 1396h (Supp. V 1975), and, following federal action, information to state disciplinary
bodies relating to criminal convictions or other federal action which may then provide the basis
for state disciplinary proceedings leading to possible license suspension or revocation, or other
state disciplinary sanctions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(e)(2)(B) (1970). While these federal remedies re-
lating to Medicare and Medicaid abuse and fraud raise significant issues relating to professional
discipline and to controls of expenditures, they do not appear to raise problems of restraints of
trade or of anticompetitive impact in the absence of evidence that they are applied selectively or in
some retaliatory manner.
For a discussion of the potential use of PRSO information by state disciplinary bodies, see
notes 162 infra and accompanying text.
151. On the constitutionality of the PSRO law, see Lang v. Berger, 427 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). The PSRO system is not a system of control over the practice of medicine which violates §
1395, nor does it interfere with a physician's right to practice his profession. American Medical
Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1202-03 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Association of Am. Physicians and
Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 132 (N.D. Il. 1975).
152. In general terms, utilization review was intended to provide for the examination of the
uses of health facilities and institutions to prevent waste and misapplication of scarce resources. In
particular, it was intended to ensure that long hospital stays for expensive inpatient treatment
occur only when medically necessary. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1970). The PSRO system strongly
resembles the earlier scheme of utilization review in relying on professional self-regulation and
peer review, with government underwriting the effort and imposing organizational requirements
without, however, setting standards or playing a major role in their enforcement. The PSROs
scheme was enacted without repeal of the utilization review provisions in part because the estab-
lishment of PSROs and their full operational effectiveness were expected to take time. However,
when the PSRO is deemed competent as a reviewing body, the earlier statutory utilization review
provisions will no longer be applicable. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-l(e) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 5(a), 91 Stat. 1183 (1977); 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(e)(l) (Supp. V 1975). Utiliza-
tion review became a requirement for participating hospitals under Medicare in 1966. 42 U.S.C. §
1395x(k) (1970). Utilization review requirements had been included in 1965, in the Standards for
Accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals composed of representatives
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
Although there is evidence that Congress had intended to establish
a mechanism designed primarily to achieve cost controls, the initial di-
rection of the legislation was changed during its passage, and was fur-
ther redirected following its passage when HEW directives relating to
PSROs continued to stress quality control and deemphasized matters
relating to costs.'5 3 In part, this change in emphasis is reflected in the
structure of PSROs which emphasizes peer review by local physicians
and which provides substantial opportunities for local and state medi-
cal society influence. 154
To be designated a PSRO, a professional organization must have
the following characteristics: first, it must be a nonprofit professional
organization operating in the area; second, its membership must repre-
sent a substantial portion of the physicians in the area; third, member-
ship must be voluntary; fourth, membership must be open to all
physicians in the area without regard to membership in, or payment of
dues to, any medical society or association; fifth, the organization must
be able to make available professionally competent personnel to review
the health care services for which PSROs are responsible; and finally,
the organization must not restrict member eligibility for service in the
PSRO. S5
It is evident that the federal law does not allow state or local medi-
cal societies to function as PSROs because this would condition mem-
bership in the PSRO on membership in, or the payment of dues to, a
medical society, contrary to the statute. Nonetheless, the requirements
for PSROs assure that only an organization acceptable to the local or
state medical society will be designated as a PSRO.
of the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association. See ARTHUR D.
LITTLE, INC., AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UTILIZATION REVIEW ACTIVITES IN
HosPiTALS 17 (Final Report on Contract HJM 110-71-192, 1972).
153. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 149, at 60-68.
154. The Secretary was to establish PSRO areas in accordance with criteria which emphasize
local control. As far as possible, areas are not to exceed a physician population of 2,500. The
nation has been divided into 203 PSRO areas, most of them local areas, though twenty-eight
states, including the state of Georgia and Washington, each with over 4,000 practicing physicians,
were designated as single state PSRO areas. In each of the PSRO areas, the Secretary of HEW
designates a qualified professional organization as the PSRO for that area. U.S. DEP'T OF HEW,
PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL ch. H § 204.4 (1975).
When the Secretary has determined that an organization is qualified and prepared to serve as
a PSRO, he gives notice to the physicians practicing in the PSRO area of his intent to enter into a
PSRO agreement with the organization. If more than ten percent of the physicians object, he must
conduct a poll to determine that at least 50 percent of the physicians in the area consider the
organization to be sufficiently representative of area physicians to serve as a PSRO. 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-1() (1970).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-l(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975); Association of Am. Physicians and Sur-
geons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 140 (N.D. M. 1975).
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The local PSRO has primary responsibilty for the setting and re-
view of professional standards.156 This is likely to give the local medi-
cal society a great deal of power, and although Congress and HEW
have created other regulatory bodies, it is unlikely that these will de-
tract significantly from the power wielded by state and local medical
societies working with and through PSROs. The review sytem also pro-
vides for statewide councils 157 and a national council to aid in coordi-
nating activities and disseminating information.
158
The PSRO hospital review system is comprised of three elements:
concurrent review of hospital admissions and continued care; medical
care evaluation studies (MCE); and analysis of hospital, practitioner
and patient profiles.' 59 Congress apparently intended the profile analy-
sis component to be a very important part of the system and one which
could have significant implications for physician discipline.
1 60
The analysis of physician profiles could be used to enforce the
practitioner's statutory obligation to meet professionally recognized
standards of health care. Physician profiles would also enable PSROs
to determine physician needs for continuing medical education, and
would assist state licensing boards in setting their continuing education
requirements. Profiles of physicians who create risks to patients that
raise a question of their competence to practice medicine could be used
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
157. In any state with two or more PSROs, a Statewide Professional Standard Review Council
may be established through a majority vote of the practicing physicians in each PSRO area. 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-l(g)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(c) (Supp. V 1975). The hope has been expressed that the National
Council will aid in breaking down the dominance of local community standards despite the em-
phasis of the PSRO statute on local standards. The National Council is to develop data on re-
gional standards of medical quality and communicate such data to local PSROs. It has been
suggested that this nationwide comparison of standards will tend to temper the emphasis on local
standards when comparison shows the regional standards to be more effective. The suggestion of
such a significant role for the National Council is probably overly-optimistic. The emphasis on
local, rather than national, standards was a distinct victory for AMA interests, who saw a greater
opportunity for influencing the process at the state, rather than the national level, because at the
state level the interests of the medical societies and the state regulatory mechanisms overlap most
closely. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 149, at 47-48. Not only was the emphasis on local,
rather than national, standards an AMA victory, but it was also a clearly regressive step. For years
the emphasis in medical training and in professional standards had been to approach national
uniformity of qualification and performance. Indeed, in medical malpractice litigation, the stan-
dard of professional competence in recent years has increasingy been the national stan-
dard-because the regional or local standard asserted in the defense against malpractice claims
has invariably been the lower standard. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d
793, 798 (Super. Ct. 1968); Faulkner v. Pezeshki, 44 Ohio App. 2d 186, 192, 337 N.E.2d 158, 163
(CL App. 1975).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(1)-(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975); U.S. DEPT OF HEW, PSRO PROoRAM
MANuIAL, Ch. II § 204.4 (1975).
160. S. REp. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1972).
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to trigger disciplinary proceedings if such profiles were made available
to appropriate state medical boards. However, it is unlikely that profile
analyses will be used for such purposes. A far more limited use is envis-
aged, with the profiles serving essentially as a check on other review
components. Moreover, since PSROs will not for some time address the
performance of physicians in their office practices, 161 the number of
individual physician profiles available is likely to be limited. In addi-
tion, it is probable that the use of physician profiles for disciplinary
purposes will be limited by unclear legal provisions and narrow regula-
tions which will not allow information to be freely provided by PSROs
to state disciplinary agencies.'
62
The PSRO system itself provides for a variety of sanctions, apart
from any possible uses of PSRO information in state proceedings. If the
PSRO determines that the provision of health care services does not
meet the requirements of medical necessity, conformity with quality
standards, or, in the case of inpatient services, economy, the most direct
sanction is the disallowance of Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement;
this sanction provides for prior notification of both practitioner and pa-
tient when feasible. When there has been either substantial failure to
comply with the obligation to provide care which is medically neces-
sary and which meets professionally recognized standards, or gross and
flagrant violation of such obligation on one or more occasions, a physi-
cian may be excluded from future eligibility for Medicaid or Medicare
161. Under the PSRO statute, review is initially limited to inpatient short-stay general hospi-
tals with review of long-term care facilities to be implemented more slowly.
Ambulatory care provided to Medicare or Medicaid patients was not required to be reviewed
under the original PSRO legislation but under the 1977 amendment the Secretary of HEW is
required to develop effective methods for the review of ambulatory care by PSROs within two
years. Such reviews may be ordered within two years of the time the PSRO has achieved opera-
tional status. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(g) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-142, § c(l)(D),
91 Stat. 1184 (1977).
162. The PSRO statute is not clear on the potential of the use of PSRO information by state
disciplinary bodies. On the one hand, the Secretary is to provide by regulation for the "correlation
of activities,. . . interchange of data and information, and. . . other cooperation. . . between
and among... any other public or private agency. . . having review or control functions.... "
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-14-14(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). On the other hand, another section provides that
"any data or information acquired by any ... [PSRO] ... shall be held in confidence and shall
not be disclosed to any person except. . . in such cases and under such circumstances as the
Secretary shall by regulations provide to assure adequate protection of the rights and interests of
patients, health care practitioners, or providers of health care." Id. § 1320c-15(a). Provisions ad-
ded to the confidentiality section by amendment in October 1977 imply that disclosure is to be
limited to evidence of fraud and abuse. Id. § 1320c-15(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91
Stat. 1189 (1977). Thus, it is unlikely that PSRO information on physician competence will be-
come available for state disciplinary proceedings unless fraud and abuse are involved. The 1977
amendment displays a considerable concern, therefore, for the protection of physicians.
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reimbursement. 16 3 As a condition of continued eligiblity, he can be re-
quired to pay back to the United States the cost of the substandard care
up to $5,000.14
The PSRO system raises a number of antitrust issues. It is a system
of peer review run entirely by physicians, in particular by a group of
local physicians who not only are encouraged, but also are required by
federal law to apply local standards. Thus, the nature of the PSROs
makes them virtually dependent upon state and local medical societies.
Although PSROs are too recent and undeveloped to have given rise to
actual complaints of restraints of trade, it requires little ingenuity to
project a number of not-so-hypothetical cases.
For example, in setting its local standards, it would not be difficult
for the PSRO to impose physician backup and other personnel require-
ments which would make it impossible for alternative medical facilities
to provide low cost abortions.1 65 Moreover, these requirements could
be justified on the almost unassailable grounds of patient protection
and desirably high standards of medical care.
Similarly, it would not be difficult for a local PSRO, consisting
exclusively of local physicians with significant interests in continuing
their private practices, to set standards relating to the use of physicians'
assistants and other allied health personnel so as to limit their eco-
nomic use, thereby jeopardizing relatively lower cost prepaid medical
plans such as HMOs. The opposition of medical societies to prepaid
plans, HMOs and other schemes which do not seek fee-for-service is a
matter of history, 66 and there is little evidence that there has been any
major change in attitudes.
The PSRO system also creates a situation where it will not be diffi-
cult to "gang up" on physicians who are not in favor with the local
society when physician profiles are developed and hospital admissions
and other professional matters are reviewed.67 A few questionable de-
nials of admission, a few refusals to extend hospital stays, and the
probability of denials of reimbursement-without any realistic oppor-
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
164. Id. Such a payback penalty and other sanctions may be imposed only after a rather
detailed and full review which includes review by the Statewide Council and a hearing by the
Secretary. Judicial review for claims exceeding $1,000 is provided. Id. § 405(b), (g) (1970).
165. See discussion of Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Fla. 1976), at note 29 supra.
166. See, eg., AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
167. Cf. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soe'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961) (un-
written rule of county medical society excluded from membership a duly licensed and registered
physician who had not graduated from an AMA-approved medical college). See note 109 supra.
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tunity for timely appeals of such decisions 16s-and the physician's pro-
fessional prospects may be substantially diminished.
Federally sponsored peer review organizations engaged in carry-
ing out a significant federal policy should be free from antitrust con-
straints unless a real case of the kind suggested above can be made
against them. However, because a local PSRO, as defined and required
by law, is a private organization with a government contract and a set
of functions and obligations specified by federal law and regulations, it
clearly is not immune from antitrust prosecution. 169 Indeed, the role of
the local PSRO bears some similarity to the role of the stock exchange
as described in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.'70 Justice
Goldberg, speaking for a divided court, outlined the development of
the exchange from a private club of dealers in securities to a recognized
entity with designated functions under the Securities Exchange Act171
and then explained the nature of the problem:
The difficult problem here arises from the need to reconcile pur-
suit of the antitrust aim of eliminating restraints on competition with
the effective operation of a public policy contemplating that securi-
ties exchanges will engage in self-regulation which may well have
anticompetitive effects in general and in specific applications. 72
The analogy between the development from private peer review
within medical societies to federally sponsored PSROs and the devel-
opment of the role of the stock exchange is not too remote. Both the
stock exchange and PSROs are private organizations that have been
given recognition by federal law. In both instances, a private organiza-
tion has been delegated the public function of self-regulating an occu-
pation or profession, and in both situations self-policing can easily turn
into anticompetitive, exclusionary self-protection.
The Silver Court ruled that the "statutory scheme" of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act was "not sufficiently pervasive to create a total ex-
emption from the antitrust laws"' 73 and found a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. Abusive exercises of delegated powers of self-regulation
by a PSRO may have similar antitrust consequences.
168. See Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1974).
169. The role of the local PSRO may be analogous to that of the integrated bar in Goldfarb.
See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
170. 373 U.S. 341, 349-51 (1963).
171. Id. at 350-52.
172. Id. at 349. Significantly, the Court referred to a "federally mandated duty of self-polic-
ing." Id. at 352.
173. Id. at 361. The case involved the unexplained and procedurally defective denial by the
New York Stock Exchange of direct telephone lines and stock ticker connections to non-member
securities dealers, who, in consequence of this denial, were effectively disabled from carrying on
their business.
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Silver joined a line of cases which have dealt with the problem of
harmonizing or reconciling federal antitrust laws not with state, but
with federal regulatory statutes. 174 The common conclusions in these
cases have been that a federal regulatory statute does not provide im-
munity from antitrust enforcement, and that both laws will be given
effect to the fullest extent possible. 75 In the case of PSROs there is no
irreconcilable conflict. On the contrary, the constraints of the Sherman
Act are more likely to keep PRSOs honest by compelling them to focus
on regulations and standards that are protective of patients rather than
of local physicians.
The composition of PRSOs makes them particularly subject to an-
titrust concern. An official regulatory board is not immune from sanc-
tions when it is composed entirely of members of the regulated
profession, and when the issue before the board places its members in
the adversary position of competitors rather than neutral regulators.
PSROs, in their relationship with HMOs or other, less conventional
providers of health services, may well find their members in similar
competitive positions. 176
CONCLUSION
Medical discipline-the regulation of the professional practice of
physicians-is not a neatly ordered field. It consists of several regula-
tory layers and reflects state and federal policies as well as professional
self-regulation by private professional organizations, certifying bodies
and hospitals. Thus, a physician is licensed by a state regulatory body,
but he is certified as a specialist by a private specialty organization. He
is subject to the professional discipline of his private local or state med-
ical society, his own state medical board and the peer review group
within the hospital where he works. If he has Medicare or Medicaid
patients, he is also subject to his local or state PSRO, which is a private
organization operating under federal sponsorship with delegated re-
sponsibilities of self-regulation. Although he is subject to professional
discipline from a variety of agencies or bodies, it is very likely that the
actual control of his professional conduct is far more unified than
174. In Silver, the Court, commenting on its own decision, added:
We have today provided not a brake upon the private partner executing the public policy
of self-regulation but a balance wheel to insure that it can perform this necessary activity
in a setting compatible with the objectives of both the antitrust laws and the Securities
Exchange Act.
Id. at 367.
175. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-19 (1966); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348, 350-51 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S.
482, 485 (1962); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939).
176. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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would first appear, because all of these agencies and bodies are part of
a single network with both formal and informal lines of connection.
To be admitted to practice, the physician must show that he has a
medical degree from an accredited medical school. Although the ac-
creditation, in form, is that of the state medical board, it actually is that
of an accrediting body of the AMA. He must also pass a qualifying
examination. Again in form it is an examination required by the state
medical board, while in actual practice it is one of three national exam-
inations prepared by, or with the cooperation of, major national orga-
nizations including the AMA. If the physician wishes to become a
specialist-as most do-he must meet the requirements of a particular
specialty board, which include the completion of an approved resi-
dency in an accredited hospital. Such residencies are approved by a
committee of national medical and specialty groups including the
AMA, and the hospital is accredited by the Joint Committee on the
Accreditation of Hospitals, in which the American Hospital Associa-
tion and the AMA hold membership.
After he has been licensed by the state medical board, the physi-
cian is subject to its regulation and continuing discipline. The state
medical board is composed of a majority, usually a large majority, of
physicians who generally have been named to membership from lists
supplied to the governor by state and local medical societies. Indeed, in
at least one state, the governing body of the state medical society is the
state medical board. In any event, the state medical societies, which
generally are subsidiaries of the AMA, provide a number of services to
the state board. They may assist the state board in developing the re-
quired continuing medical education, in supervising disabled physi-
cians who are on probation or in limited practice and in supplying
information to the medical board regarding instances in which a physi-
cian has been disciplined by the state or local medical society. In a
small number of states, the medical society is charged with investigat-
ing violations of the medical practice act for the state medical board.
The physician's hospital practice is subject to internal peer review
procedures, generally in accordance with recommendations of the Joint
Committee on the Accreditation of Hospitals. His grant of privileges to
treat his patients at the hospital is likely to be facilitated by his mem-
bership in the local or state medical society. It will also be eased by his
status as a board-certified specialist.
The physician's professional performance in the hospital is subject
not only to review by hospital peer review committees, but also, if he
treats Medicare and Medicaid patients, it is, or shortly will be, subject
to review by the local PSRO. This organization of his peers, while hay-
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ing no formal connection with the local or state medical society, is
probably closely connected with it because of the manner in which
PSROs are established.
In spite of this substantial peer review apparatus, the outcome of
professional discipline, whether administered by the state or a medical
society, has been minimal. The lack of statistics on the subject is itself a
matter that engenders skepticism. The minimal figures that are avail-
able show that of some 325,000 physicians in the United States, fewer
than one hundred have their licenses revoked each year, and only a
very few are disciplined by their own medical societies.
Does any of this point to sinister, wholesale conspiracies in re-
straint of trade by the medical profession? Probably not. But it does
point to a cozy, close relationship of the regulators and the profession-
als they are regulating, relationships which provide ample opportuni-
ties for abuse and for practices that may have an anticompetitive
impact. Thus, antitrust enforcement, or the threat of such enforcement,
against the would-be regulators and self-regulators may enhance the
effectiveness of the regulatory process. Antitrust enforcement does not
conflict with sound professional regulation, and nothing in the
Goldfarb case would produce such a conflict. There is a need for sound
regulation of the quality of medical care, and for the policing of incom-
petence in professional practice. Federal antitrust laws do not interfere
with the enforcement of sound professional standards promulgated in
the exercise of the states' police power, nor do they interfere with pro-
fessional self-regulation that is designed to protect the public and up-
hold professional standards, even when such state regulation or self-
regulation has incidental anticompetitive effects. On the contrary, anti-
trust enforcement is far more likely to promote sound professional in-
fluence on the disciplinary scheme by eliminating improper self-
protective and economic restraints that encumber the system.
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